


AN
ENQUIRY
INTO THE
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OF
MAKING CONQUESTS
FOR THE
MAHOMETANS in INDIA.



AN
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MAKING CONQUESTS
FOR THE
MAHOMETANS in INDIA,
BY THE *BRITISH* ARMS;
In ANSWER to a PAMPHLET,
INTITULED
“*Considerations on the Conquest of Tanjore.*”

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M.DCC.LXXIX.



A N
E N Q U I R Y
I N T O T H E
P O L I C Y, &c.

S E C T I O N I.

Character and merits of the Nabob prove nothing in favour of his conquest of Tanjore.—Can have no right to possess himself of that country on account of the matters with which he charges the King of Tanjore.—Nature of those charges.

TH E success of the British arms in Hindostan, during the last war, has brought us into very close connexions with many of the Princes of that country, both Indian and Mahometan. Their several rights wholly depending upon the British power, must be finally determined upon, by the British justice. Among the innumerable controversies concerning Indian claims, those of the King of Tanjore, and Mahomet Ali Khân, Nabob of Arcot, have lately attracted the greatest share of the public attention.

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The contrast between the proceedings of these two powers, which is very strongly marked in every respect, has been in no instance more striking than in the manner of their seeking redress for the injuries they respectively complain of.

From the year 1769, if not from a more early period, the Nabob has engaged a number of persons to act for him in Europe, in a great variety of ways. These gentlemen have endeavoured to recommend themselves to their employer, by their extraordinary zeal and activity in his service; and their pretensions to that kind of merit are not wholly without foundation. They have been indefatigable in their intrigues and publications. They have filled the world with many new topics of argument, and new narratives of fact. They have even been at the pains of correcting and amending history; in order to accommodate it to his views, and for the sake of setting us right, not only with regard to his character and pretensions, but even to his pedigree. Nothing on their side has been wanting to form a party in his favour. He had great objects in view, which were not to be compassed but by the arms of the English. It was therefore natural, that nothing should be omitted which might tend to obtain the authority, or at least the connivance, of Great Britain, in the use, which he had already made, and which he was still in hopes of making, of the power of this kingdom in India.

The King of Tanjore, on the other hand, having had no such views of conquest, having nothing to expect from our force, and having for a long time no apprehensions from our violence,

violence *, was satisfied to preserve his intercourse with this country, solely through the ordinary channels of office.

Three solemn treaties violated—two invasions—two plunderings of his country—two years imprisonment of his person—made no alteration in his plan. He expected justice, in the ordinary course of business, from the authority that the nation has made competent to give it. He has in some measure found it ; and it is to be hoped, that at length he will find it more perfectly.

Not one person, during this long period of his sufferings, has ever once endeavoured, on his part, to interest the public in his favour. If the world has at all been apprised of the injuries he has sustained from his powerful neighbour, the Nabob of Arcot, it has incidentally arisen from the sort of propriety that others have felt of vindicating their own character, and their public conduct, from the aspersions of the active and vindictive partisans of the Nabob.

It was this sense of honour that impelled the Directors of the East India Company, and the family of Lord Pigot, to make those appeals to the public, which have fully justified the national wisdom in its act of justice and sound policy, the restoration of the kingdom of Tanjore to its original and rightful owner.

This extraordinary reserve of the Tanjoreans, whether owing to moderation or remissness, has given the enemies of that

* See the assurances of English protection pledged to him. Company's Papers, Appendix, No. 8.

unhappy people great advantages over them. Besides the operation of direct agency against them, the very channels of communication between India and Europe have been vitiated by being secured to a party. Relief from a remote protector is always tardy, and generally incomplete. It is a part of the reparation of old injuries to provide some security against new ones ; for, it is not uncommon to consign to oblivion the causes of a grievance, when it has received some degree of redress. The judicial memory of the public, is not very retentive of the evidence which had originally determined it. Those who are interested in repeating the injury, have therefore a sort of advantage in bringing forward the fictions and fallacies, by which they supported their former wrong, as if they were fresh matter, and every one of their attempts to renew their violences is in some measure to be tried as a new cause. This has been very lately the case, in the attempts to revive the exploded topics for establishing a system of conquest by English arms, in favour of the Nabob of Arcot ; the constant pursuit of which system for twenty years, has brought innumerable and unspeakable calamities on all the southern part of Hindostan, and reduced so many considerable Princes, such numbers of respectable Nobility, and the industrious inhabitants of so many once flourishing and opulent countries, to the last degree of indigence and distress, to say nothing of the multitude of lives which have been lost in the extravagant enterprizes, which had their rise in this fatal design.

The humanity, the justice, and the honour of the nation,
are

are interested in the use which is made of the formidable power it has acquired in the East ; and we ought to look carefully into those pretended rights of Princes and Conquerors, recommended to us in such a multiplicity of writings, whenever they are to be exercised by the subversion of ancient and respectable establishments. A conqueror, who supports his own pride by his own power, may be very unjust, he is not, however, ridiculous—but nothing is so contemptible in the eye of reason as extreme ambition, depending upon extrinsic force ; and which is a suppliant, not for protection, but for superiority, dominion, and conquest. The purpose of all the manœuvres, and all the publications, on the part of the Nabob, is to prevail on us to make him a great conqueror by our violence.

An addition has lately been made to these publications, by a Pamphlet, called “ Considerations on the Conquest of “ Tanjore.” It did not seem very necessary to revive the discussion of a question, which after many violent disputes, and many great struggles, has been settled by a competent authority. By that settlement, the King of Tanjore was re-established on the throne of his ancestors, under the protection of the East India Company, and in a condition of intire dependence upon Great Britain *.

An establishment for any country which is settled under the dominion of its natural sovereign, a sovereign connected with his

* The terms by which he was re-established, are before the Reader in an Appendix.

subjects in affections, manners, and religion, and at the same time secured in a state of absolute subserviency to the interest of this kingdom, seems to be too solidly built, upon foundations both of justice and of good policy, to make an undertaking to overturn it, a very plausible project.

The professed purpose of the Pamphlet before us (of which its author says a great many good things) is nothing less than a modest proposal to the King and Parliament to abdicate their authority over Tanjore; and to surrender the sovereign of that nation, and his people, into the hands of a Mahometan despot, the bitter and implacable enemy of that sovereign and that people. It proposes that this should be adopted by, or forced upon, the East India Company; which is to be made the instrument of a *third* revolution, in direct violation of its own faith, most solemnly and recently given; in violation of terms prescribed by the Company itself, and punctually complied with in every particular, by the King of Tanjore.

In an attempt against possession *so* supported, in favour of a Pretender on the most odious of all claims, a *supposed right of conquest*, the author ought to have done something more than repeat the arguments which have been so often refuted. It is, I admit, no objection against an argument, that it has been used before; but then, in a renewed controversy, the adverse party is obliged to take the matter in its new state. He is bound to consider the original argument and its answer together; and, by shewing the futility of the latter, to confirm, if he can, the former in its first authority. Without some observation of this rule, controversies can have no end.

The author of these "Considerations" sets out with more professions of candour and decorum than, I think, I have ever met with in any political publication. But I must beg leave to say, that he supports these professions very indifferently, and that he is neither very decent to his adversaries, nor very respectful to his reader, in not attempting to reply to the answers that have been so often made to the arguments he uses. He is not to be suffered to evade the performance of this indispensable duty, by telling us in a high tone " * *WE* have carefully avoided the disgusting paths
 " of controversy, the assertions equally confident and unfounded, the quotations equally partial and inconclusive,
 " in short, the complicated arrogance and fallacy, in which
 " some writers on this subject have indulged themselves." That in " some late publications, the writers jumbling together persons and things, and mixing calumny with sophistry, are generally possessed of a convenient inattention
 " to the facts and arguments of their opponents." That
 " their arguments are supported by self-references, and their
 " facts are proved by garbled appendixes."

This profession of avoiding the paths of controversy, in a *controverted* matter, is rather new; and as to the character this author gives to some other performances, how far it is applicable to his own mode of writing, rather than to that of his adversaries, will be seen hereafter. But, since he does not choose to quote those whom he chooses in this

* Considerations, pages 29 and 30.

manner to asperse, it is necessary the Reader should know who the writers are whom he treats with a contempt, which, however politic, is not very agreeable to the modesty and moderation he professes. The first of these writers is Mr. Rous, a member of Parliament, and a barrister of acknowledged abilities and learning; the accuracy and judgment of whose performance † has fully justified the opinion the world had conceived of his talents. This gentleman, had he not been entitled to better treatment on account of his own acknowledged merits, had still a claim to some sort of attention from the authority under which he writes. His work is undertaken with the sanction, and by the express desire of the Directors of the East India Company. He is supplied with his materials out of their records, and he produces them in order to refute the rash charges against that respectable body, contained in two Pamphlets, one intituled, “*State of Facts relative to Tanjore* ;” and the other intituled, “*Original Papers relative to Tanjore*.” Those pamphlets are, in reality, the foundation of the work now before us. — The other gentleman he alludes to does not put his name to his book; but he too is known to be a barrister, and a man of considerable parts, and eminent in the literary world.

Without recriminating on the author of the “*Considerations* ;” without enquiring into his own inducements, views, and designs, or without accusing him of “*deception or*

† “*The Restoration of the King of Tanjore considered* ;” printed by order of the Directors of the East India Company, in 1777.

sophistry,

sophistry, or of complicated arrogance and fallacy," or charging him with any party or interested motive, I will content myself with examining into his reasons for the *new revolution he proposes to effect, by delivering the kingdom of Tanjore into the hands of the Nabob of Arcot.*

His work begins, and ends, and is interlarded throughout, with a panegyric on that great Mussulman Lord. An answer to this part of his work, will not add greatly to the bulk of mine. In expatiating on the virtues and merits of his Highness, Mahomed Ali Khân, he shall have no sort of interruption from me. He has the field all to himself. I am the more willing to indulge him in his free career; because the fullest admission of all the virtues and merits, that truth or flattery can heap on the Nabob, will not give the least assistance to his cause: It will not prove, that he has the least particle of right to depose the King of Tanjore; or that it is either the duty or the interest of the English nation to put that kingdom under a Mahometan yoke.

What the author says of the alliance of this Mahometan potentate, with Great Britain—the nature of that alliance—the terms of it—and the benefit we have derived from the connexion, are all as little worth confuting. The author admits, that the Nabob, on his part, has derived reciprocal advantages from his connexion with Great Britain. — In truth, he has derived every thing from it,—fortune,—dominion,—life itself. Flying from a battle, where his father had lost his life, and his *elder Brother* was made prisoner, in

the ruin of his fortunes, and in preference to that *elder Brother*, (who is still alive) the English arms shielded him both against his foreign enemies, and the strong domestic pretension of his own family. Whatever Great Britain is said by his advocate to have received from his bounty, (and of which he has made out an extraordinary bill *) is in fact but a very small portion, which she has reserved to herself from conquests that were made, (we may fairly say) altogether by her own arms : all the rest is her gift to him. But whether the balance in this matter be on his side, or on ours, signifies very little ; the points in question are only these—Whether our alliance with him be so exclusive as to render all other alliances impossible or improper ;—or, in particular, that we were ever bound by the terms of our alliance to conquer for him, the kingdom of Tanjore?—or are now bound to depose that King, whom, by a solemn public act we have just re-established ?

Until his friends shew such conditions, in the terms of our treaty with him, the Nabob's being the best, or the King of Tanjore the worst ally in the world, are matters worthy neither of proof nor refutation. If the invectives against the unhappy Prince, so cruelly plundered by the author's friend and patron, were admitted to have a foundation in fact, which they by no means have, it might prove that he ought to be punished, or restrained, or, (if he will) even deposed ; but they would not prove that the Nabob of

* Confid. pages 3, 4, 5.

Arcot ought to be put into possession of a country which does not belong to him.

In the first place, it is proper to observe, that if the King of Tanjore, the present possessor, has not behaved as He ought to have done, (which is not admitted, and never can be proved) his misbehaviour does not forfeit the just claim of his family, or his tribe, to a kingdom which has always gone in succession. Much less does it forfeit the right of the native inhabitants, to be governed by Princes of their own religion and manners. This has been virtually admitted even by Mahomet Ali himself; for, whilst his ambition was young and modest, He pretended nothing further than a desire of placing another Prince of the same blood upon the throne of that kingdom.

2dly, It is to be remembered, that if the King of Tanjore has misbehaved, so as to incur a forfeiture, it is not the Nabob, but their common superior, the Grand Mogul, who has in that case, the right to hear the cause, to adjudge the offence, to pronounce the sentence, and to allot the disposition of the forfeiture.

3dly, The reader is called upon to remark, that no evidence is before the Company or the Nation, of the truth of any one material charge made against the King of Tanjore. — The Nabob's advocate has not produced, nor even attempted to produce, any sort of *proofs* of any delinquency at any time. His method is, first to advance the Nabob's own charges as facts; and then, (as it is usual in such cases) he

supplies the total defect of evidence, by the utmost profusion of railing and abuse.

It would be matter of eternal infamy to those who possess the smallest attention to justice, to receive the mere assertions of a man deeply interested in the question, either as proofs of a right on his own part, or of a punishable delinquency on that of the party whom he attacks; especially when it is for the purpose of inducing a lucrative forfeiture in his own favour. Instead of expecting to be called on for rigid proofs in support of such harsh claims, the party of Mahomet Ali think they have done full enough, in justification of revolutions, wars, and devastations, when they give us a string of surmises, suspicions, and invectives, as if they were unquestionable and acknowledged truths perfectly known to the whole world. “What mischiefs,” says this author *, “may be apprehended from restoring a country so situated, so circumstanced, to the sway of a man so notoriously abandoned to all ties of duty, faith, and honour, as the Rajah of Tanjore? Are the dark schemes he formed with Monsieur Lally, to seize on Trichinopoly, forgotten? Are his after-plottings with Hyder Ali, Isoph Cawn, and other powers, dangerous and inimical to the Company, totally obliterated? Is he not at this instant, though scarcely seated on the throne of his ancestors, engaged with Hyder in a deep intrigue with the Chevalier St. Aubin, a daring and wily adventurer, sent out by Monsieur Sartine, the French minister?”

* Considerations, p. 52, and 53.

This sort of specimen of their mode of accusation I have thought fit to lay before the reader. To explain at large all these matters here huddled together, would require a volume. But as the author has not thought fit to take any notice of the satisfactory answers already given to most of these calumnies, I think it sufficient to refer the reader to the books already mentioned; I mean the Company's publication, through Mr. Rous, and the Defence of Lord Pigot. With regard to the last insinuation, concerning the present King of Tanjore, as I suppose it relates to things done since the publication of those pieces, I have only to observe, that the unfairness of the author is not excusable even by the licence of an advocate. He gives no proof; he cites no authority; and he substitutes in the place of all evidence, the supposed notoriety of a transaction which never has been heard of; which never did exist.

I shall further beg leave to remark, that this very dangerous person, this restless, turbulent, plotting King of Tanjore, who has put the gentleman into such a flutter, by his deep intrigues with the Chevalier St. Aubin and Monsieur Sartine, has not a foldier in the world; that his house is guarded, and his capital is garrisoned by a body of English troops, which may be reinforced to any number; and that the far greater part of his clear revenue is given for their payment.

As to the Nabob's grievances, I suppose no one ever attempted to injure another, without some sort of complaint of injury supposed to be done, or intended, to himself; and

if

if the mere complaint of a party is sufficient justification for consequent violences, no Prince can want an excuse to seize upon the possessions of his neighbour. — I would ask this gentleman, who urges us so vehemently, to employ the English power and arms for such worthy purposes, why neither he nor his friends have thought proper to produce the letters, or the treaties, or any other vouchers whatever, of the King of Tanjore's being the aggressor, in any acts or designs to the Nabob's prejudice, or to that of the Company, whose interest they so incessantly affect to connect with *his* ambition?

Nothing is more easy than to sweep away this whole mass of calumny. But it is playing the game of Slander, and raising it to importance, to treat it with the solemnity which belongs to grave accusation. When *vouchers* of these manœuvres, charged on the King of Tanjore, are produced, it will be time enough to examine into their nature. Until the accusations are made to the King of Tanjore himself, and He is called upon to answer for them, in a place where he may refute them, all these loose assertions, made at nine thousand miles distance from him, and of which, except in the stile of vexatious general reproaches, he hears nothing at home, they must be considered in no other light, than as the most indecent pretexts that ever were employed to colour the proceedings of rapacity and ambition.

SECTION II.

Nature of the records produced by the author, examined.—To what objects, and by what means, the Company's approbation has been obtained.—The Company imposed upon by the servants in India.

IF the evidence of the Nabob himself, in favour of his own usurpation, is of no force, of as little is that of those who were his accomplices in his designs, or his instigators to them. * His advocate makes a great parade of his *solid* facts, of his authentic papers, and of his unquestionable *records*; all which prove (as he asserts) the *necessity* of the original conquest, the *guilt* of the Rajah of Tanjore, and the *propriety* of reinstating him (the Nabob) in the possession of that kingdom, which had been just rescued from his usurpation.

A record is a very serious thing, and the best of all evidence; But every written paper is not a record. When records are stated *as evidence in a question of right*, they ought to be, 1st, papers either written by the party against whom they are produced, or admitted by him, as valid and authentic—or, 2dly, they ought to be documents of facts from indifferent persons;—or, 3dly, evidence taken judicially. But, I believe the reader will be surprised to find, that three-fourths of the pretended records, with which this pamphlet is filled, are neither more nor less than the mere representations of those servants of the Company, who were

* Confid. p. 17, 30, &c.

the instruments of the Nabob in his usurpation of Tanjore, representations made to their masters, the Directors, with a view to justify their own conduct. These letters may be admitted as *pleadings in the cause*; and as pleadings, they are good, as far as the force of their reasoning goes; but it is the first time, that such representations were ever taken as *matters of fact*, or admitted as indisputable evidence, or as any evidence at all, when the question itself is, “ Whether the
 “ act itself which these representations are made to cover,
 “ was justifiable or not ? ”

Of this nature is the correspondence of the *Select Committee at Madrafs*, which in the Pamphlet before us is constantly adduced as unexceptionable evidence for the gentlemen of that Committee in their own cause; pompously cited as an authentic record; and as regularly referred to, as if it were the sworn testimony of indifferent and impartial persons, upon a judicial examination into the merits of the proceeding.

Some things, however, very material, are to be observed in these pretended Records, besides their incurable invalidity as evidence: First, it is to be observed, that if they were admitted as unexceptionable testimony, they do not at all come up to the purpose for which the author produces them—for though the letters of the Select Committee at Madrafs are very free in their invectives against the King of Tanjore, and frequently enforce the necessity of *humbling, reducing, chastising, compelling him to do justice to the*

Nabob, &c. &c. &c. yet they no where presume to tell their masters, that they have had a *conquest of that country, for the Nabob, in view*, nor do they in any place, endeavour to commend *that measure*.

Secondly, The Committee itself has taken away all the authority which can be supposed to belong even to their own partial allegations, so far as they tend to a justification of hostilities against the King of Tanjore: for, they are forced by truth to profess explicitly, that they have acted in that affair *against their own judgment*, and they urge the compulsion and necessity they were under, as their apology. “ This government,” say they *, “ as *guarantees*, “ *ought* to have marched a force to *maintain peace*, between “ the complaining parties, to have required deputies from “ *both, to state the demands* of each respectively, and, upon a “ *fair discussion*, to have decided between them, and to have “ enforced the decision, whether in favour of the Nabob, or “ in favour of the Rajah; but your government here did “ *not dare* to act such a part. It was plain from your orders to this Committee, under date the 17 March 1769, “ as well as subsequent orders, that you thought the Rajah “ stood in a degree of favour with this government, which “ you did not approve; and that you adopted all the Nabob’s ideas of levying crores, as an equitable pretension, because other Subahs had done so. At the same time the “ minister of the crown, ranging himself on the side of the

* First volume of Company’s Appendix, p. 180 and 181.

“ Nabob, received all his complaints against the Rajah as
 “ gospel.

“ Our conclusion is, that one of these decisive measures
 “ should be adopted with firmness and vigour ; either to take
 “ Tanjore, openly and avowedly, under your protection, and
 “ *give him proofs of your impartial justice* ; which we think, *even*
 “ *now, notwithstanding what has passed, will bind him firmly to*
 “ *your interest*—or to conquer and subdue him totally :—but
 “ in the latter case, the consequent arrangements will be
 “ matter of the most serious consideration. What we said
 “ on this subject by the Britannia contains our sense ; and
 “ since the year 1768, such lights have been thrown on *the*
 “ *Nabob's character and conduct*, as may amply suffice to enable
 “ your Honours to determine with justice and propriety ; we
 “ therefore only add, that every day convinces us we have
 “ not been mistaken, and we confirm every word we have
 “ wrote.”

It is not material to the cause of Tanjore, to enquire whether the Select Committee at Madras were or were not under the compulsion they alledge from the King's Commissioners in India, or from Administration here, or whether the Company thought them too partial to the King of Tanjore. We are not examining into the force of their apology for their conduct. It is plain, that *they were themselves of opinion against the part which they took* ; that they were of opinion, that they ought to have *maintained peace* ; that they ought to have *called on the parties* to make their respective demands ; that they
 ought

ought to have allowed *a fair discussion*, and *enforced an equitable decision*. They allow, that the King of Tanjore ought to have had *proofs of impartial justice*, which, they themselves declare, would bind him, *even now* (after all that has passed) to our interest : all this they allow to be their duty ; they allow also that there is no part of this duty, that they have done. And this totally sets aside their authority, such as it is, for the rectitude of the measure they adopted ; and rests the proof of that rectitude upon those whom they assert to have compelled them thus to act against their judgment.

As to the British Ministry, what authority for the Nabob's usurpation was given by them, I profess, I do not at all see. I do not find a syllable in the whole printed Correspondence, that tends to prove that they have authorized the *conquest* of Tanjore in favour of the Mahometans. If such orders had existed, I take it for granted, they would have been produced. The authority, therefore, supposed to be derived from the British Ministry, also falls to the ground.

With regard to the King's several Ministers plenipotentiary in India, what their powers were, or whether they had any powers at all, to authorize *such acts*, I will not pretend to say. These specific powers, never were produced. The King's Commissioners certainly never did act as principals ; and however they might encourage, countenance, and even terrify the Presidency (as they state it) into the part they took against their judgment—they, as well as the Presidency, are parties, and cannot be witnesses. They, too, stand upon the

truth of the facts which they alledge, of which they must bring proof. Indeed they alledge none upon their own knowledge, nor is it to be expected they should; for the records of the East India Company were not in the hands of the Commissioners, and they could have no personal knowledge of facts. They were strangers in India, and could take their line, both of facts and politics, only from the Nabob, or from the Company's servants: which throws the whole back on the original actors, the Nabob, and the Select Committee; the one of which was a party in interest, and the other, as we have seen, acted against their own sense of things. Indeed, whether we consider the subordinate acting, either of the King's Commissioners, or the Company's servants; whether using force, or submitting to it; whether the one is to be blamed, or the other pitied; whatever judgment we may choose to pass on their motives, it is perfectly ridiculous to urge their own assertions in justification of their own conduct. Men's own declarations are the strongest evidence against themselves, but they operate as nothing in their favour.

The author, even when he goes higher than Servants or Commissioners, and states his records in proof of the opinion of the Company itself, does not perform a great deal more for the cause he espouses.—The Company's disapprobation, in some instances, of the conduct of the Rajah of Tajore—their wish, that *when convenient* he may be *chastised*, and that the Nabob's *pretensions* against him may be rendered effectual,—all this is not in the least material to the single point to be proved.

If we were to admit that the Directors, in the accounts, upon which they founded their opinions, were not deceived, and that their desire of *chastising* the Rajah, and of enforcing the *pretensions* of the Nabob, were perfectly just; — yet *chastising* does not imply *deposing*; and enforcing the Nabob's *pretensions* does not, by the terms, authorize making a *conquest*. If the author could shew, that any where in that correspondence, the Company's servants had first stated to their masters, that they thought it expedient to *dethrone* the King of Tanjore, and to deliver over both him and his people to the mercy of the Nabob, Mahomet Ali; and that *these* had been the Nabob's pretensions, and their views; and if the Company had approved their measures, on that fair state of them,—the papers would have been properly cited to prove the Company's approbation. The facts, on which that approbation was grounded, would, indeed, still demand a proof—but the fact of the approbation itself, however obtained, would have been established. But as matters now stand, there is not a syllable in those records (such records as they are) to the purpose for which they are quoted. The Presidency never, as I have just remarked, once acquainted the Directors with such designs of theirs, or such pretensions of the Nabob. The pretensions of the Nabob, on which the Company gave their opinion, were only, that the Nabob might receive the arrears of his Pishcush, and a reasonable sum towards the charges of the war with Hyder Ali. These pretensions, and these only, were

were before the Directors, and these only they did or could authorize.

On this point, the Presidency are themselves so full and explicit, as to take away all possibility of pretence that the Directors had any thing else submitted to their deliberation; for the Presidency says expressly “ That in the expedition against Tanjore, the declared purpose to the world “ *(whatever the latent purpose might be)* was to call the “ King of Tanjore to account, and *not* to conquer him.” “ * We have,” say they, “ *no cause to infer, from any orders* “ *we have received from the Company,* that they wish the “ fort and country of Tanjore were *conquered*, and the “ present possessor dispossessed; but, *on the contrary*, that “ they [the Directors] would not have either their posses- “ sions, or those of the Nabob, extended, or *the hereditary* “ *possessors of territories dispossessed*; but only that they should “ be reduced to such terms as may give safety to the Carnatic “ and † their own possessions.”

Words cannot be more expressive of their own sense of the orders of the Directors; they state those orders, as directly prohibiting that very act, which the writer of the pamphlet asserts the Directors to have approved; they state such a prohibition, as the known standing policy of the Company. The reader's natural feelings on the unexampled boldness of such assertions will supersede the necessity of any observations upon my part.

* Company's App. P. 970. † Company's App. P. 703.

But the Presidency went further : they not only entertained this sense of the orders of the Company, but *they explained it fully to the Nabob himself*, and gave him no hopes of his keeping any conquests they might make for him, other than provisionally, till the Company's further orders should be received.

When that Presidency meditated the expedition against Tanjore, in the year 1771, they wrote to the Directors, “ that
 “ they were in a state of *uncertainty of what measures they*
 “ *should pursue,*” that “ * they were resolved to represent to
 “ *the Nabob*, with all frankness and candour, that in case
 “ the King of Tanjore shall refuse to pay an adequate
 “ sum of money, and the conquest of the country be
 “ thereupon judged necessary, any arrangements respecting
 “ such conquest must be regarded as *merely temporary, un-*
 “ *til the Company's pleasure shall be known ;* whose orders
 “ thereon, they observe to *him, must be implicitly obeyed by*
 “ *their servants.*” They further recite, “ † the Committee's
 “ *avowed knowledge* that the Company wish *not to subvert*
 “ *the established government of ANY power,* with whom they
 “ have political connexion. In case the Rajah be subdued,
 “ it were better *to restore him,* or to place some more fit
 “ person of *his* family in the government of Tanjore, upon
 “ paying such Pishcush to the Circar as might be proper,
 “ affigning a revenue for payment of charges of the expe-
 “ dition, and for the maintenance of a garrison to be kept

* Company's App. P. 33.

† Company's App. P. 35.

“ in the town on the part of the Company, and also for
 “ a sufficient force to protect the country ; or, if the above
 “ be not agreeable to the Nabob, that the revenues should
 “ then be put under his direction ; but that *the fort should*
 “ *remain in our hands*, and that both should be considered
 “ as deposits, *till the Company's pleasure should be known.*”

The record containing this account, (which our candid writer has totally omitted,) puts an end to all pretence of deceit practised on their Nabob, which is one of this party's principal grounds for re-investing him with the kingdom of Tanjore. The Nabob knew, (if his associates spoke truth) from the beginning the terms upon which he was to undertake hostilities. He knew that his possession (if he was to possess at all) was to be but *temporary*, and subject to the Company's pleasure. The same record also shews, that the Select Committee were perfectly apprized of the Company's * invariable sentiments (so often over and over again urged upon them) against extending the Nabob's territories, and against subverting *any* established government. It is, in fact, the constant burthen of their song for years together. By all this, the direct contrary of this author's position, “ That the Company authorized the *conquest*, “ and deceived the Nabob,” is fully and clearly proved.

It is remarkable, that the very Select Committee itself, under whose auspices the conquest for the Nabob was carried on, had been instituted for the express purpose of restraining and checking such conquests. They could not take

* Vide Company's Appendix, No. xx.

a single step towards conquests, in their capacity of a Select Committee, without knowing that, in that step they violated their duty.

Our author, in stating the paragraph of the Director's letter which reproaches them with this breach of their duty, is pleased to talk of the Directors, as if they had misrepresented their own orders; and that their servants were better judges of their intentions, than they themselves were. The Directors say,
 " That the establishment of a Select Committee, in March 1769,
 " was professedly with a view to the confining our influence
 " and possessions, and to retreating back within those limits
 " which our Governor and Council had exceeded, by at-
 " tempting to extend the possessions of the Nabob of the
 " Carnatic."

Our author is pleased to stile it " palpable sophistry, to in-
 " clude Tanjore in this order," because (as he says) it applied only to the invasion of Mysore; as if the prohibition was restricted to one particular conquest, and did not extend to every act for such purposes, that could disturb the peace of the Carnatic. So late as the 27th of June 1770, the Directors wrote the following order to the presidency of Madras*: " We have here only to enjoin you to avoid, as
 " far as in you lies, becoming parties in any disputes between
 " the powers in India; and to pay the most strict obedience
 " to our orders for confining your views to our *present posses-*
 " *sions*; the peace and security of which, are the utmost scope

* Company's Appendix, p. 659.

“ of our wishes.” This order is general ; it is prohibitory ; it is of the most decided strictness ; and it expresses clearly the policy on which it is formed. It could not be misunderstood : but, to prevent a possibility of pleading an ambiguity in the order, unluckily for this gentleman, who has the task of defending the disobedience of the Company’s servants in India, on this, as on most occasions, the expressions of the Select Committee itself, contain a full answer to their advocate ; for they state their own *avowed knowledge*, “ that the Company wish not to subvert the established government “ of ANY power with whom they have connection.” Thus the advocate is answered out of the mouths of his clients.

But if their advocate is not put to silence by the confession of his own clients, he will find that the prohibition of making conquests was so far from originating on account of the Myfore war, so far from being subsequent to it, and confined to that object, that the Directors, in their Letters to the Presidency, chiefly condemn that Myfore war itself, as totally repugnant to their prior, positive, and repeated orders, to their orders both ancient and recent*.

Before I conclude this my inquiry into the Considerer’s allegation of the Company’s authority for the act which they reprehend in their servants, I think it right to point out to the reader, their sense of the kind of information which they had received from those servants. That information became the source of all the opinions they could entertain, or orders they

* Appendix, vol. 2. p. 521.

could give: and to give them that information fully and fairly was the first duty of every one in employment under them. Before the Directors approbation can be pleaded for the acts of their servants, those who alledge it, ought to prove that the servants performed this first duty. But, it is to be lamented that they constantly gave or withheld information, as best suited their own designs. They were taxed by the Directors with being disingenuous, so early as in their accounts of their war with Hyder Ali, and in the midst of that labyrinth of wars and negociations*, in which they chose to be engaged at that time, for the sake of extending the domination of the Nabob of Arcot. The Directors express their displeasure at the war with Hyder Ali, “ as being aggravated by the disingenuous manner, in
 “ which their affairs were represented in their advices”—“ The
 “ unfair manner in which they state their views and motives, so
 “ very different from the spirit of their proceeding”—“ Their

* 13. “ We cannot take a view of your conduct from the commencement
 “ of your negociation for the Circars, without the strongest disapprobation; and
 “ when we see the opulent fortunes suddenly acquired by our servants, who are
 “ returned since that period, it gives but too much weight to the public opinion,
 “ that this rage for negociations, treaties, and alliances, has private advantage
 “ more for its object than the public good.

14. “ We therefore direct you to form a Committee, to make a rigid scrutiny
 “ whether any, and what sums have been received for that purpose from the Subah
 “ of the Deckan, or his minister or agents, in the course of these negociations.
 “ You must apply yourselves to the Subah or his ministers; and you must use
 “ every effort to get a sight of the Deckan treasury books, where the most authentic
 “ information will be had; and if you do not act herein with that sincere desire to
 “ bring out proof which the occasion requires, you will incur our highest resentment.” General Letter, &c. Append. p. 520.—*It may easily be imagined, how far these injunctions were obeyed.*

“ declarations of their intention to make peace with Hyder
 “ Ali on certain conditions, and their having reason to con-
 “ clude, that they had before fully determined on his entire
 “ *extirpation* *”—“ That at the latter end of June, they had
 “ expressed themselves averse to a rupture with Hyder Ali,
 “ whose power they deemed a restraint on the Marattas, but
 “ before the year was closed, the depression of his power be-
 “ came a principal object of their politics †.”

This disingenuous sort of proceeding, in spite of those re-
 monstrances, was not only continued, but encreased, in the
 advices sent home of the proceedings against Tanjore. The Di-
 rectors, after stating that the plan mentioned by the Presidency,
 of keeping the revenue of Tanjore as a deposit until the plea-
 sure of the Company should be known, proceed thus: “ ‡ The
 “ above advices were communicated to us by the ship Duke
 “ of Portland, and your conduct upon the occasion received,
 “ as it justly merited, our entire approbation. That ship
 “ sailed from Fort St. George the 23d of July, 1771; but
 “ we find, that *the very next day*, the Nabob being desirous
 “ of accommodating matters with the King of Tanjore, the
 “ majority of the Select Committee resolved, That such ne-
 “ gociations should *not be conducted by our representatives,*
 “ *as* guarantees of the treaty of 1762, but *be left entirely*
 “ *to the Nabob*: and we also find, that though you wrote

* Company's Appendix, p. 521.

† Ibid. 518.

‡ 36 Par. of Gen. Letter, dated 12th April, 1775. Appendix, vol. 1. p. 147
 and 148.

“ to us three days afterwards over land, *you never suggested*
 “ *the least hint of having departed from your former opinion.*”

“ * In September, 1771, you inform the Nabob, that as
 “ you were acting in support of his government, and partly
 “ as guarantees of the treaty of 1762, whatever should be
 “ taken from the King of Tanjore, whether forts, coun-
 “ tries, money, effects, or military stores, *all should be left*
 “ *at his disposal, together with the Rajah, his family, and*
 “ *dependents, if they should fall into your hands.* The
 “ 9th of October following you wrote to us by the Stag
 “ frigate, *but were entirely silent respecting the above stipu-*
 “ *lations;* and as you thought proper to defer sending us
 “ your proceedings by that conveyance, we received a copy
 “ of the treaty of 1771, *before* we were apprized of the
 “ unwarrantable engagements entered into with the Na-
 “ bob.”

Here the reader will see, and will pity, the miserable condition of the native Princes of India. At the same time he will see the necessity of not being too hasty in giving credit to the Nabob's advocates, when they censure the Company for inconsistency of conduct, for their endeavours to rectify any errors into which they may have fallen by giving too easy a belief to their servants abroad, who have not scrupled to mislead them, by the most unjustifiable representations.

The author of the work before us, who prides himself

* 38 Par. of Gen. Letter, dated 12th April, 1775.

on his candor, ought to have taken some notice of the character (given by the Directors) of the representations from their servants; but he has wholly suppressed it; as he has, indeed, suppressed most of the representations themselves. These material circumstances, so suppressed, entirely clear the point in question; as they shew by what means, and to what objects, the Company's *entire approbation* was applied.

Thus I have shewn the natural invalidity and incompetency of most of this author's evidence, being the evidence of the parties themselves; I have shewn, that where it might be competent, it was not to the purpose; I have shewn that these parties (parties as they are) confess that they acted against their judgment, against their duty, and against the express orders they received; and I have shewn that the approbation pleaded in their favour was obtained upon a premeditated concealment of truth, and premeditated suggestion of falsehood.

What I have hitherto said, or what I may have further to say of the English government in India, is not from the smallest design of criminating individuals. I endeavour as much as possible, in this necessary enquiry into measures, very carefully to confine myself to the measures themselves, unmixed with any thing of private anecdote, or with any discussion whatever of personal motives. But as the Nabob's partizans appear desirous of acting over again the dreadful scenes that have ruined a great part of India, and as they refer to their former transactions, in proof of the justice and
policy

policy of the plans they recommend for our future conduct; it becomes absolutely necessary to review that ground; and to reconsider those measures. Measures cannot always be handled tenderly; as tenderness in that case to the conduct of a few, would be the greatest of all cruelties, to multitudes. At the same time, in order that the *measures* should stand forward and receive their full justice, with as little prejudice as possible to men, very few individuals are so much as named, where they cannot be commended. Collective descriptions are always chosen; and acts done in corporate capacities are alone discussed. It is, I believe, impossible to bring an enquiry nearer to pure abstraction, or to confine it more strictly to mere measures.

It is not that this delicacy would be universally proper; but the truth is, that unjustifiable political actions are not always done upon the worst principles. All political situations have their difficulties; fashions of opinion, have their day; and many men of honour and integrity are borne away by the torrent of the times, who, on recollection, would be far from wishing to repeat acts, of which, until they were done, all the consequences could not perhaps be so distinctly perceived: The rage of party too, mixes in all these matters; and men are for a time so heated, that they do not always see, in destroying an *enemy*, how much they injure a *man*. Wherever I find myself obliged to give any strong epithets to very blameable actions (without doing which, I must speak of them in an unnatural, and affected manner) I do not mean to transfer
 them

them in every case to the actors, much less to preclude the apology, which times and circumstances make for men engaged in great affairs. I look to the cause and forget the men, some of whom it is possible enough that on other accounts, and from the general tenor of their behaviour in life, I may value and respect.

S E C T I O N III.

Examination of the motives to the war on the King of Tanjore, in 1771—Our state relative to the King of Tanjore and the Nabob of Arcot—Ambitious views of the Nabob, and his early design on Tanjore—War with Hyder Ali.

I Shall now beg leave, having reviewed the defence of the conquest of Tanjore so far as it is placed upon the ground of authority, to consider it a little on the foundation of reason and justice.

To enter into a country with fire and sword—to plunder it without mercy—to seize upon the person of a Prince—to confiscate his revenues—to despoil him of all his effects, and to imprison him and his family, are no light things; nor to be done but upon serious grounds, and the most urgent and evident necessity.—Some delay of payments (however just and reasonable the demand) is no reason at all for drawing the sword and throwing away the scabbard. It

is not a want of strict performance of every minute engagement; it is not every charge of his having engaged in a scuffle with a neighbouring power (even if the charge were perfectly true, and the act not perfectly defensible) that can justify the invasion of a country, and the total destruction of an illustrious family. Nor ought our Presidency, in reason, conscience, or policy, to have lent themselves to such enterprizes on such grounds. Even after they had embarked in the war, they themselves declare to Mahomet Ali, their wishes that the matter might be rather terminated by a *negociation*: their wishes, therefore, whether real or pretended, indicate their judgment to be—that extension of conquest ought, if possible, to be avoided. They say also, that they incline to think it not good policy to reduce Tanjore, and place it under the management and control of the Nabob.

So far, however, from trying the effect of negociation, though the King of Tanjore, both by his Letter and by his Vakeel, had declared himself ready and willing to settle every thing through the mediation of the English *, they

* Company's Appendix, p. 717. Minutes of Select Committee, 27th July, 1771. The Committee had recommended it to the Vakeel to go to the Nabob.—The Minute recites, “The Vakeel seemed much alarmed, said, *his Master had, in his Letter to the Presidency, referred the differences between him and the Nabob, to the Company, and wished we would take upon us to mediate between them.*” Some time after, being again admitted, the Vakeel said, “his Master was ready and willing to settle terms of accommodation, under the guarantee of the English, on whose faith and promise he would rely; but he would never trust the Nabob, *without the security of the English*, as he well knew the Nabob's intentions were to accommodate matters for the present, but that he had bad intentions, whenever an opportunity should offer in future.”

chose to follow the Nabob's advice, and, according to their expressions, *to drive him to despair*.

From the resolution of driving him to despair arose those two cruel wars, which, within the compass of about two years, they waged upon the King of Tanjore. In the first of which, they weakened and exhausted that kingdom; in the last of which, they deposed the Sovereign, and ruined the country. The first of these invasions by the Nabob, was in 1771, the latter in 1773.

I shall endeavour to state, as shortly as possible, both the motives and the pretexts to those wars; and for this purpose it will be necessary, for the satisfaction of such readers as are not perfectly conversant with Indian history, to turn our eyes a few years backward.

When the Company first began to interfere in the politics of India, they found the then King of Tanjore an hereditary sovereign Prince, in undisturbed possession of great splendor, power, and opulence, derived from a long line of royal ancestors. Mahomet Ali, second in descent from an adventurer appointed to the Phoufdary, or subordinate military government of Arcot, by the Subah or Viceroy of the Decan—and that, too, in prejudice of his *elder brother*, still living—was found by the Company, at that time, capitulating with his rival, Chunda Saheb, the protégé of France, for his last fortress.

With Tanjore the Company formed the first regular alliance
they

they made in India *; and by that alliance they instantly acquired an important place, the town and district of Devicota.—By the assistance of the King of Tanjore, they gave the first turn to the war with France. Mr. Lally was repulsed from the walls of Tanjore; the siege of which place had been undertaken, and its destruction denounced, for the King's adherence to our interests. Through the whole of that war, to the final reduction of Pondicherry, the King of Tanjore assisted, with his troops, in the Common Cause.

The Nabob of Arcot had the largest, the most immediate, and the most beneficial share of all the strength he exerted. Tanjore first preserved him from Famine † in Trichinopoly; and afterwards continued a support to him, with so much steadiness and effect; that at length the General of that country, Monackgi, (one of the gallantest men, and one of the best officers that was perhaps ever born in India) delivered to him the head of his rival Chunda Saheb; and thereby put him in the undisputed possession of his government. These are substantial and notorious facts, recorded in the histories of the Coromandel wars, before the present controversies had given occasion to alter, to colour, or to disguise them. The endeavour to weaken the force of these facts at this day, by a subtle discussion of the motives of the several actors at several periods, or by involving them in the

* Orme's Hist. and Company's Appendix, Vol. I. No. 5.

† Nabob's Letter, March, 1775. "The support of the fort of Trichinopoly depends on the friendship of the King of Tanjore and Tondeman."

intricate politics of India, will be of little avail to weaken the conclusions which naturally result from them. They stand, and will stand, as monuments to prove to the latest posterity, how much of our power in India has been owing to the favour and protection of a generous Indian Prince, whom, at that time, we did not disdain to call a King *, as he had always been called by ourselves and all the world, and to address him by the style of Majesty ; though some have lately thought fit wholly to discontinue that title and that mode of address ; and can find no other names for him than *feudatory*, *vassal*, *zemindar*, and other contemptuous appellations ; used promiscuously, with little regard to their contradictions one to the other ; but all of them contrary to his just, clear, natural, and confessed rights.

The late King of Tanjore (father of the present) had indeed at times his doubts and fears of those, whom upon the whole, he most faithfully supported ; and it was nothing but what was very natural. If he had apprehensions from the power of France and Chunda Saheb, he had something likewise to dread from the English and from Mahomet Ali. Grounds for his apprehensions, both from us and the Nabob, had been furnished at a very early period in our intercourse ; and bitter experience has since shewn him, that he was not wholly mistaken.

Our acquaintance with the King of Tanjore began with

* Company's App. No. 3 and 4, and all the Correspondence from our first intercourse with him.

an attempt to set up a pretender to his crown, and with hostilities commenced in consequence of that attempt. The origin of our union with the Nabob was the very reverse of this. Our connection with him began by our freeing him from a powerful Rival and Pretender to his authority; if a man, almost in possession of all, in actual possession of Arcot, and by as good a title as his own, could be called a Pretender. But unfortunately, when power is in question, it is better to receive than to confer benefits. The fate of the two allies has been in the inverse proportion of their merits and services. From standing on the verge of ruin, from a state almost of captivity, Mahomet Ali is become, by the assistance of the English and the King of Tanjore, one of the most powerful princes in India;—the King of Tanjore, from immense opulence, is now very nearly what the Nabob was found at the commencement of our connection with him. When the English first became acquainted with the King of Tanjore, they were so struck with the magnificence of his court, that they thought it worthy of a particular notice. “On our entering*,” says Colonel Lawrence “the Tanjore country, the King sent his prime
 “minister, Succogee, to compliment the Nabob and his
 “allies.—On our arrival at Candore, the King desired to meet
 “the Nabob and me half way. I set out the 4th, in com-
 “pany with the Nabob and Mr. Palk, who had been with me
 “from my leaving Madrafs. The King met us at the place

* Cambridge, Page 58.

“appointed,

“ appointed, attended by his whole Court, who on the occasion
 “ made a very magnificent, splendid appearance. He was es-
 “ corted by 3,000 horse, well mounted, and a great many
 “ elephants in silver trappings. After ceremoniously passing
 “ each other in our palankeens, we were conducted to a plea-
 “ sant garden, and there received by the King, under a pavil-
 “ lion supported by pillars of silver, elegantly covered and
 “ furnished. There we renewed our assurances of friendship
 “ and protection, and all our former engagements; and it
 “ was determined that the King should support the Nabob,
 “ and join him the next day with three thousand horse, and
 “ a like number of seapoys. After a refreshment of fruits,
 “ a shower of rose-water, and being anointed with otter of
 “ roses, we were dismissed with presents of elephants, horses
 “ and sirpahs, and escorted to our camp by a brilliant party
 “ of the Rajah’s cavalry.”

It is not necessary to make the late forlorn, or even the
 present patched up condition of the Prince of that country, a
 contrast to this description; which however is far short of
 what might in those days be given without exaggeration, of
 the splendor of the court of Tanjore, arising from the opu-
 lence of a territory, not great indeed in extent, but filled with
 a numerous, flourishing, well-governed, industrious and con-
 tented people.

This wealth of the kingdom and court of Tanjore, which
 at first excited admiration, came afterwards, probably, to
 stimulate other passions. The advantage which the Nabob

derived from the use of part of it, became his motive for wishing to seize upon the whole. From the moment that the superiority of the English forces in India was become indisputable, and that he found means of acquiring such an influence as to obtain the direction of those forces, he began to form a variety of ambitious * designs, which were to be compassed by the destruction, or (according to his favourite expression) by the *extirpation* of all the princes of that country. He even went so far as to propose a rebellion against his immediate master, the Subah of the Decan †; a power equally under the protection of that treaty of Paris, upon which his partizans affect exclusively to value him. This proposition, of placing himself by rebellion on the seat of his superior, had no other pretence, than the benevolent idea, that the divisions of the Subah's family afforded him a favourable opportunity.

“ The tenor ‡ of the Nabob's conduct” (say the Presidency

* After an account of the surrender of Pondicherry, Mr. Orme gives the following lively description of the avaricious, ambitious, and vindictive spirit of the Nabob: “ The Nabob requested and *expected*, that the army, after the necessary repose, would accompany him against such Chiefs and Feudatories whom he *wished*, or had pretensions to call to account, either for contempts of his authority, or for tributes unsettled or withheld. He had not forgiven the rebellion of his half-brother Nazeabulla of Nellore; his indignation had never ceased against Mortizally the Killidar of Vellore, and Ariellore and Worriorpollam to the South, were *suspected of hidden treasures*; still more the greater and the lesser Maranars; and the King of Tanjore, wealthier than all, scarcely considered the Nabob as his superior.” Orme, Vol. II. Page 725.

† App. No. XX.

‡ Company's Appendix, Vol. II. P. 609.

“ who

who acted in support of that design) “ points out clearly, that
 “ the conquest of the Tanjore country, the Mysore possessions
 “ in the Payen Ghaut, and the possession of the Decan, are
 “ objects of which his ambition has never lost sight.”

Our author condescends to allow, that this project of de-
 posing his master had found place in his mind, * “ He wished
 “ to be made Subah of the Decan. He did so. But when the
 “ Company wished the contrary, observe (says his advocate)
 “ how this ambitious aspirer expressed himself—† It is true,
 “ I was desirous of extending my government and your in-
 “ fluence over the whole Decan country, but” (adopting, by
 the by, the very words of the Directors) “ as a little in peace,
 “ and security, is to be preferred to uncertain and greater
 “ possessions, involved in difficulties and so liable to troubles,
 “ *agreeably to your friendly advice*, I shall confine my views to
 “ peace and the Carnatic country, satisfied that I shall never
 “ want your protection.”

Though in this instance he missed the opportunity of gratify-
 ing his ambition, he furnishes matter of panegyric to our au-
 thor, for relinquishing to the Directors, designs which he could
 have no shadow of hope of carrying into execution but by
 English forces. The intention being however substantiated,
 proves the extent of his ambition; which is all I have to do
 with it. The relinquishing of his object proves nothing more,
 than that he can submit to necessity. No body ever doubted it.

* Considerations, P. 58.

† Extract from Nabob's Letter to Directors, January, 1778, Pages 58, 59.

Indeed

Indeed there is no one who will be at the pains to look through his correspondence, but must see that it is his constant method, to propose scheme after scheme, project after project, for raising disturbances, and enlarging his own power; and though he often lays those projects down as lightly as he takes them up, he has, at the same time, the address to make a merit of giving up one of his designs, in order to serve him in obtaining assistance for the execution of another.

Frustrated in his hopes of obtaining the Decan, he proposed a plan for the *extirpation* of Hyder Ali, the King of Myfore. He had the luck to engage the arms of the Company in this wicked scheme, contrary to all the ideas and instructions of the Direction. The author indeed, in justification of an attempt which ended in his patron's and our disgrace, tells us, that “* The plan of conquering that country, *originated solely* with the Governor and Council of Madrafs. It was a measure *certainly very improper*; but of its impropriety, even in its commencement or progress, much less in any *objects of ambition it was to attain*, the Nabob had *no share*, for he was *allured* into the part he took in that transaction, by the *fallacious promises* of the Company's servants, calculated to make him instrumental to their purposes.”

It is a little hard in the Nabob's advocate, to lean so heavily on his friends at Madrafs. I believe it would not be difficult to prove, that the measure originated in the Durbar,

* Considerations, Page 59.

and not in the Presidency; but our author and I agree that it was "*certainly a very improper measure.*" I should not have quarrelled with him, had he used a stronger term: but wherever it might originate, it was (had not the attempt failed) to have concluded, with putting the kingdom of Myfore into the possession of the Nabob *. A regiment of Europeans and ten thousand Seapoys were to be kept up, to establish him in that possession. The author agrees that the Presidency did hold out *something* to him, and did make him *some promises*. He certainly claimed a right to Myfore; and the author tells us, that the Company cannot *conquer* for themselves. "† The East India Company are," says he, "a chartered body of merchants united, as their appellation expressly imports, merely for the purposes of trade. The powers therefore with which they are invested, are limited to the protection of their property and commerce; if they transgress this line, and attempt, *as principals*, to controul sovereign Princes, *they assume a lawless power.*" None but the Nabob, according to his own ideas and those of his advocate, could possess the country. I am therefore

* Company's App. p. 521. Directors letter to the Presidency, March 17, 1769, P. 4. "Yet with those orders before you, (which are expressly said to be positive, repeated, and recent) you can calmly deliberate on the keeping up a Regiment of Europeans and 10,000 Seapoys, to establish the Nabob Mahomed Aly in the Myfore country: our displeasure hereat is aggravated by the *dissingenuous* manner in which these affairs are represented to us in your advices."

† Considerations, Page 67.

obliged to put the Myfore war to the account of his ambition ; without meaning to exclude any other purposes, that the author may attribute to his associates, who it seems deluded him, or, to preserve his own term as more expressive, *allured* him with “ fallacious promises.” The truth however is, that their proceedings were in consequence of the Nabob’s own proposals *.

Whatever were his designs on Myfore, or whoever may have allured him into them, Tanjore was the ultimate object of all his manœuvres, and that, which he never suffered to escape out of his view. To that point the testimonies of the gentlemen concerned with him in the execution of these designs, are full and direct ; for, besides what they have just told us, they further say, † “ That the Nabob
 “ has *constantly* had in view the design of *conquering Tanjore*,
 “ *will not admit of a doubt* ; and we are firmly persuaded,
 “ that his chief motive for concluding peace with the
 “ Rajah, at a time when our troops were upon the point
 “ of getting possession of the place, arose *from his jea-*
 “ *lousy, lest the Company purposed, at a convenient opportunity,*
 “ *to take the country from him.* By that expedition however
 “ he obtained, what he *earnestly wished for, viz. the removal*
 “ *of that restraint* which he thought himself under by the
 “ *Company’s guarantee of 1762.*”

Here some very material points are settled on their proper

* Company’s Appendix, Page 521.

† Company’s Appendix, Vol. I. Page 230, 521.

basis. First we see established, the systematic design of the Nabob for the conquest of Tanjore; which shews that his quarrel was in subservience to that design, and not that design formed in consequence of any grounds of quarrel. In the next place, this passage proves, that his treaty of 1762, and the Company's guarantee, were a great burthen to him; and consequently that all his allegations of breach of that treaty on the part of the King of Tanjore, must naturally be suspicious, where it was so much his interest and his wish to suppose it violated *.

From that, his grand, original, invariable purpose, the conquest of Tanjore, he never ceased from the moment of his settlement in the Carnatic. He therefore never omitted any means to bring on a rupture with that kingdom †; for finding himself obliged to desist from his monstrous claim of exacting indefinite sums by force, and to accept of a certain payment with a positive exclusion of all other demands, by the *odious* treaty of 1762, he made perpetual efforts to set aside that agreement; first, on *his* usual pretence of having consented to it *unwillingly*, and afterwards by stating it as a temporary arrangement, which expired with *the* father of the present King of Tanjore. In pursuance of the same invariable purpose, he had long before made a black attempt to accuse the present King of Tanjore of the murder of that father. That charge indeed he dropped, as soon as he

* Comp. App. P. 640.

† Company's Appendix, Vol. I. Page 53.

found that the good sense and humanity of Mr. Palk discouraged so malicious and shocking an invention; and instantly relinquishing his accusation of poison and murder (with as much readiness as he abandoned the conquest of the Decan, and for the same reason) he wrote the King of Tanjore a congratulatory letter on his succession to the throne of his father, as false as the accusation he had began with. He has made, and to this hour continues to make, perpetual attempts to desolate* the country of Tanjore, by diverting the water which fertilizes it. Had he been suffered intirely to accomplish this latter scheme, it would have brought on a famine in that country, and even distressed the whole coast of Coromandel.

His continued hostile designs were evident; and in India he took no pains to conceal them. For a long time, however, he was not able, either by his numerous agents here, or by his manœuvres at Madras, to engage the English forces in a project so contrary to all decency, reason, policy, and public faith. He was more early in his success in engaging them in the other and preliminary part of this plan, the extirpation of the King of Mysore, which I cannot avoid mentioning, from its perpetual connection with the present question. He knew that if he succeeded in that part of his

* Company's Appendix, P. 68. Nabob's Plea. "The banks of water belonging to the Tanjore country remain in my bounds; for which reason the affairs of Tanjore *can be finished in a better manner whenever we require.*" Nabob's Plea, P. 71. App. 5th Par. "In case of displeasure, if a few Cooleys are sent to break down the banks, it occasions great loss to the Tanjoreans; and the Tanjore country will be in great want of water."

plan, Tanjore would not be in a condition to give him a moment's opposition. Failing of the success he expected against Hyder Ali, he endeavoured to make himself amends by renewing his attempts on Tanjore itself. He now saw a most favourable opportunity. He saw, that the losses and expences of the Company in that Mysore war, would make them readily listen to any scheme against Tanjore, short of conquest (the design of which he as carefully concealed from them, as he was indifferent about its publication in the East) that promised reimbursement of their charges. At the same time he knew that the Presidency at Madras, loaded with the disgrace and blame of that unfortunate and unprovoked attempt, would be very ready to lay the cause of failure any where rather than on themselves, or on their associate; and that of course they would be ready to join heartily in any complaint against a neighbouring power, the moment the circumstances of the country would permit it. All these motives concurred to foment the quarrel with the King of Tanjore, which was ripened into a war in the year 1771*.

* Consider. P. 15, 16.

SECTION IV.

Pretexts for the war of 1771 examined—Duplicity of the Nabob and his Party.

THE above being the real *motives* to the war, namely, the settled system of the Nabob for the conquest of Tanjore, and the necessity for finding some advantage to balance the losses and disgraces in the war with Hyder Ali; it is necessary to state the *pretexts* for it, and to examine into their merits. The first of these pretexts was, That in this war with Hyder Ali, the Rajah had not sent assistance to him (Mahomed) and the Presidency of Madras.—The second was,—that he had made war on certain Polygars under the Nabob's protection.—The third,—that the stated payment of the Mogul's tribute, had been delayed beyond the usual time *.

With regard to the first of these pretexts, the not sending assistance in the war of Mysore with Hyder Ali,—let us suppose for a moment, that the charge was founded, and not one man had been sent on the occasion. Will Mahomed Ali's advocates condescend to shew what obligations the King of Tanjore was under, to take any part whatever in that war? The treaty of 1762, never bound him to any such assistance; nay, it contained express words, limiting the whole of his obligation to the payment of the Mogul's tribute. This is

* Vide Confid. P. 15.

confessed.

confessed by the very same persons who made war upon him
 for not sending the assistance which he was not bound to send;
 for in the course of that war, they expressly tell the Nabob
 himself, “ † That as *no mention* is made in *any* part of the
 “ treaty, that he, the King of Tanjore, is obliged to join us
 “ on *any* occasion, how can we with any propriety, and with-
 “ out acting contrary to the said treaty, make the demand
 “ of him you mention, (viz. of money;) especially as his
 “ conduct since, has, in some measure, made amends for it,
 “ *a body of his troops being now employed with Colonel Wood?*”
 But upon the plea of the Rajah’s peaceable enjoyment of his
 country (when no one was disturbing him) they undertake to
 apply to him, to bear a further part of the burthen of the
 war: and the President’s letter proceeds — “ But whether he
 “ *will voluntarily consent thereto, may be doubted*; for as, by the
 “ treaty with him, we have deprived ourselves of *every pretence*
 “ to *insist* upon it, were we to make such a demand, it might
 “ be construed *a breach of treaty*, and bring *a reproach upon*
 “ *your Excellency, as well as upon ourselves, of a breach of our*
 “ *faith*; which, bound as we are by such *solemn engagements*,
 “ we ought scrupulously to avoid giving the least foundation
 “ for.”

So far as to the part the King of Tanjore was bound by
 treaty to take in that, or in any quarrel of the Nabob; and
 such is the sentence passed by the Presidency on the first

† Company’s App. P. 170. The Governor’s letter to the Nabob, App. 19,
 1768.

ground of their attack on Tanjore, I mean its not having assisted in the war against Hyder Ali,—the merits of which war, at this day, no man (no not our author) attempts to justify, on the ground either of its justice or expediency; and in the event of which, there was so little reason for exultation. But whatever the merits of that war might be, ought we not to ask, If the Rajah was not *bound* by treaty to assist in it, had he any other motives? Was he previously consulted about it? Was he to derive any sort of immediate benefit from it? Was it for his remote interests? On the contrary, was it not made for the direct purpose of destroying every power capable of keeping the Nabob of Arcot within the bounds of moderation, and consequently of having the King of Tanjore entirely at his mercy? The very advocate for the Nabob tells us it was “a very improper measure.”—If it appears so to him, what could recommend it to the Rajah?—Had he embarked with zeal and eagerness in such a war, He must have been completely out of his senses.

The reader who finds, that the Rajah's holding back of assistance in the war with Hyder Ali, is made a ground of war upon himself (though on such a foundation as we have just seen) will be led to suppose, that the fact at least is indisputable. It is indeed a species of fact, the existence or non-existence of which cannot be equivocal. What must be the reader's indignation, when he sees in the paper just cited, that the foundation of the charge is absolutely false; and that the

King of Tanjore, from his desire of being well with our nation, notwithstanding his well-grounded fear (and hatred, if you please,) of Mahomed Ali, actually did send 3000 men to that war, under Colonel Wood? This is directly acknowledged in the same letter of the Presidency, from whence the last extract is made.

The charge is made by the Nabob, and it is argued in the pamphlet before us, as if no assistance at all had been sent; yet, as the fact to the contrary, stared them in the face, it was necessary to dispute the *value* of the services; and without any attention to the contradiction, they assert, “ That the Rajah’s
“ troops were of no manner of use.”

There is so little dependence to be had upon assertions from the Nabob’s quarter, and so little light has been thrown on the detail of that war, that I cannot undertake to say positively whether they were of use or not. It is not indeed easy to ascertain the proportion of the utility of any particular corps of troops serving in a large army. Though the Commander may not employ them, they still tend to give respect, and add to the opinion of the general strength. If they were not employed, and ought to have been so, it was the fault of the Nabob and his Allies, who had the entire command of them, and who did not choose to employ them. But if from their ill constitution, or their disaffection, they had been (which I take to be far from the truth) of no use; yet let it be recollected that they could not
be

be more defective than the Nabob's * own troops, who were worse than of no use; for if they did not absolutely betray the places they were appointed to garrison, to Hyder Ali, they abandoned them through cowardice and want of discipline, and thus became one cause of the unfortunate issue of that unjust war.

But if the Nabob's friend takes new ground, and will assert that the *delay* and not the refusal of sending troops was made the cause of complaint; to this I answer, That when the fact of his sending troops is established, when it is proved that he was under no obligation to furnish any troops, I have a right to ask, how his delay in sending what he was not obliged to send at all, should become a crime of that magnitude?

But I will suppose, for argument, that he was obliged by some duty or other, to send a military force in this (to him unnatural) war; yet, as no treaty had either defined the time, nor the † quota, nor had any specific requisitions been made,

* Our author himself gives us his unquestionable testimony to the badness of the Nabob's troops. He does not suppose that the Nabob would wish to trust even his darling prey of Tanjore in the hands of his own forces. "He must," (says his advocate) "well remember the danger of Trichinopoly, which would have fallen into other hands, if the troops of the Company had not been within its walls; that if Tanjore were only defended by the Nabob's seapoys, a sudden attack upon it by the European powers, and other enemies, might lose that country to the Nabob, and involve in consequence, both him and the Company in heavy misfortunes." Considerations, P. 61.

† "What quota of troops or treasure should be furnished in time of war, we cannot ascertain, either by usage or compact; it appears therefore to us, to have
H 2
" been

made, how came the late time and deficient quantity of the aid he sent, to become a just ground of hostility against him? The confederates make no scruple to receive and derive all the advantages they could from the King of Tanjore's troops, (which they confess they had no right to require); and when they have no longer occasion for them, and have clapped up a peace with their enemy, then they fall upon their ally, on the pretence of his not having done enough.

Let us however go the full length they would have us go, and admit the delay and its guilt in the fullest extent, yet surely it is not decent for those to complain of the delay of others, who are not alert themselves. The Nabob, who thinks the Rajah's delay a good reason for

“ been *arbitrary*: that is to say, the government of the Carnatic hath *exacted*
 “ *whatever it had power to compel, and Tanjore hath refused succours or money, as far*
 “ *as the government thought it had power to support such refusal.* This is by no
 “ means peculiar to these two states, the same principle prevails invariably
 “ throughout Indostan.” Appendix, P. 938.

N. B. This is a testimony from an enemy. The Presidency recommending the reduction of Tanjore for the benefit either of the Nabob or the Company, on the same mere principle of *power*, without a pretence of *right*—it may possibly be matter of curiosity to the reader to see what the conclusion is that they draw from the above premises. “ Upon this principle (say they) which
 “ *is wholly that of power*, it is certainly contrary to the sound policy of the Carnatic to suffer the *existence of such a state.*”—*Viz.* Tanjore. To common men it would seem an odd conclusion, that because one state *claimed* an extravagant and absurd *power* over another state, therefore the state that was vexed by the exercise of that power, ought *not to be suffered to have existence.* It would, to plain sense, sound as well, that since so absurd a power was vexatious and mischievous to humanity, the *power* ought to be annihilated, and the *state* over which it was claimed, set free from the vexation of such monstrous pretensions.

making

making war upon him, was himself slow enough to take the field against Hyder Ali. That very Presidency, who joined him in making war upon Tanjore, on pretence of remissness, express their sense of his own conduct in this affair, in the fullest and strongest manner. After charging him with being himself the occasion of the abortion of all his own designs, and with his failure in all his engagements, they accuse him of “ the
 “ *non-payment of his arrears to his own horse*, which had been a
 “ *long time lying inactive, and refusing to act for want of pay—*
 “ the Nabob (say they) after *his* proposal of going to camp,
 “ *was often pressed to do so*, and to put his horse in motion; but
 “ *he could not be prevailed on to stir*, nor did *any* of his horse
 “ *move from Arcot until a few days before Hyder’s arrival at*
 “ *the Mount*; * that is to say, at the gates of Madras, where he and they were obliged to submit to the terms of the conqueror. If the Nabob could not be prevailed on to bring his force into the field until the last moment, although in his own cause, where his glory, his interest, and all the great prizes of his ambition were at stake, and that too against the object of his bitterest enmity, with what face could he reproach, much less make war upon the King of Tanjore, for want of alacrity in a war calculated, in the second remove, for his own destruction?

In the black annals of political perfidy, there are few instances to be found of so vile a proceeding, as the whole of

* Company’s App. P.

this transaction ; that is, the acceptance of the service ; the subsequent quarrel for not having received it ; and, lastly, a war made to punish the remissness of an ally, where the principal could not be persuaded to stir.

If any thing could add to the horror and baseness of this conduct, it was, that the Presidency had actually included the Rajah in the treaty of peace with Hyder Ali. They make a studied merit with the Rajah, of having done so ; though at home they tell another story, and declare, that it was not done at their requisition, but at that of the King of Mysore, who dictated the peace. But from whatever motive it was done, done it was ; and it must have wiped off all the delinquency of the Rajah, if any such had existed. This is the fact, and thus they state it. The *manner* however in which the effect of this treaty is eluded in the pamphlet before us, is so very extraordinary, that I think I shall not be blamed for resting a little upon that part of the subject. I will therefore set out, with stating it according to their own ideas of the transaction, and in the way they wish to have it understood.

“ * By this treaty of 1769 (says the author of the pamphlet before us) “ a new alliance was formed ; to which however Hyder Ali would not accede, unless the *Rajah* of “ Tanjore should be included as a party to be protected. By “ complying with his requisition, and ratifying it in *favour* “ of the Rajah, the Company *annulled the treaty* of 1762. The “ Nabob *refusing* to subscribe this convention with Hyder,

“ he remained in his *pristine situation*, considering himself as
 “ *an ally only* of the Company.” — “ * For, besides the new
 “ relation now established between the powers of Indostan,
 “ whereby Hyder Ali became guarantee of the Rajah; *not*
 “ *against the Nabob*, for he refused to sign that incongru-
 “ ous convention, but *against the English*; the point insisted
 “ upon by Hyder, that his Ally, the Rajah, should now
 “ be included as *a party to be protected*, additionally proves,
 “ that his former protection under the former guarantee
 “ had ceased.” — “ † A series of causes concur to destroy
 “ the treaty of 1762. It was *first* broken through by the
 “ *repeated* perfidious conduct of the Rajah; it was again
 “ annulled by the new treaty of 1769.”

The game they play is perfectly new, and well worthy the
 attention of a reader, who may be inquisitive to know the
 spirit of British oriental politics. The gentlemen at Ma-
 drass make a treaty of peace with Hyder Ali, which in-
 cludes the King of Tanjore. According to the letter and
 spirit of that treaty, it is admitted, that he ought to be
 safe and sacred *as to them*. But then they have *an Ally*, the
 Nabob, in petto, who is *not included in the treaty*; he re-
 mained snug, and altogether unaffected by what had hap-
 pened. “ The ‡ Nabob (says our author) refusing to sub-
 “ scribe this convention with Hyder, he remained in his
 “ *pristine situation*, considering himself only as *an Ally* of

* Confid. Page 37.

† Ibid. Page 40.

‡ Ibid. P. 9, and again P. 37.

“ the Company,” and the Company’s convention was only “ *against themselves*, and not against the Nabob.” The Nabob is therefore still at liberty to fall upon the King of Tanjore ; though that unfortunate Prince, who must be sacrificed at any rate, had made war on the Nabob’s own side, and was included in a treaty of peace, of which the Nabob had the full benefit.

Thus far Mahomed has taken his position with judgment. The English too are not so much hampered as may appear at first view. They come into play in their turn. Although we, *on our part*, are indeed bound by the treaty ; though we tell the King of Tanjore that he owes his being included in it to *us*, yet *we* are at liberty (always, however, as allies to the Nabob) to join in the invasion of his kingdom. That is, in other words, the Nabob, as *our* ally, is not bound by our treaty ;—and as *his* ally, we are not bound by our own.

In this scandalous shuffle of prevarication and mutual connivance ; by sometimes appearing as principals, sometimes as allies ; - sometimes the Nabob being bound, and we loose, and sometimes the Nabob loose, and we bound, this extraordinary confederacy has made sport of the faith of the British nation, and of all faith.

But this is not the whole effect of the service done the King of Tanjore by this treaty with Hyder Ali, which the Presidency of Madras have, as they tell him, negociated in *his favour*, in 1769. It was not enough that, that treaty laid
him

him open to the hostilities of the Nabob, with the treaty-makers for his allies, but it had, it seems, as we have just read, an operation to annul all the former treaties, and particularly that of 1762.

If the annihilation of the treaty of 1762, was the consequence of the King of Tanjore's being included in the treaty of 1769, why did not the Presidency, who made such a *merit* of including him in it, apprise him a little of the nature of the favor they had conferred on him? It was rather unkind to conceal from him the *full extent* of the obligation for which they claim his gratitude; and if he did not make all the return that was expected, it was probably from this, their indiscreet concealment of the value of the benefit.

But after paying our due homage to this singular act of friendship, it may not be improper to enquire a little into the validity of it: I shall therefore beg leave to ask the gentlemen, on what principle the King of Tanjore, by being included by the Presidency of Madrafs in the treaty of 1769, with Hyder Ali, came to forfeit the benefit of the treaty of 1762 with Mahomed Ali, and the guarantee of that treaty by the Company?—To shew that the latter of these instruments does really derogate from the former, so as to annul it, they are bound to produce this exterminating treaty of 1769, which devours every other, and to shew wherein it is contradictory to, and destructive of the first. If any thing could, at this time of day, be astonishing in this

proceeding, it would be astonishing to observe, that the Nabob's partizans have neither produced this treaty, nor any one single article, or part of an article in it; and yet they have the confidence to assert, that it annuls the treaty of 1762. I do not find it so much as contended for, that the treaty of 1762 was ever mentioned in that of 1769 *, or that one of the parties, Hyder, so much as knew of it; or that it had in any way, ever become an object of the preceding negociation. It is indeed impossible to conceive, how a treaty of peace and mere indemnity with a third person, to which the Nabob (if we believe his advocate) was no contracting party, could annul a solemn treaty signed by himself.

As to the English, the reader will recollect, that the treaty of 1762 was made under the mediation, and with the express guarantee, of that Presidency of Madras which included the King of Tanjore in the treaty of 1769; it was approved and ratified by the Company at home; it was as complete a treaty as the Company could make it. Even if the advocates for the acts of that Presidency were able to shew (what they never can shew) that the second treaty which they made, contained matter derogatory to, and subversive of the first,

* The treaty of 69 is to be found in the Book of Treaties published by the Company, Page 58. Although the Nabob is not mentioned personally in this treaty, his country, the Carnatic Payen Ghaut, is included in it; and the King of Tanjore is mentioned *as a friend and ally of that country and the English Company.*

which

which was also made by themselves, it could not excuse, but would rather aggravate their perfidy. They were certainly not at liberty, by their own posterior voluntary act, to overturn their own prior engagement; or if they could, how can they have the absurdity and effrontery to assert, that a treaty which gave to the King of Tanjore an *additional* security, by including him in it as their *friend and ally*, was a destruction of the original security given by a former treaty?

The situation of the Princes of the East, in their dealings with the Nabob and his associates, is frightful. Observe the situation of the parties before and after this treaty of 1769 with Hyder Ali. The Company, the Nabob, and the King of Tanjore, had been making a war on this Hyder Ali, with different interests, and (as the charge is) with different exertions. A peace is to be made. In that peace, what is to become of the King of Tanjore? Is he to be included or not? If he is not, he is still open to hostility from Hyder Ali, if Hyder Ali shall so choose; but if he is included in a common treaty, this is the worst of all; for then, according to their reasoning and practice, the old treaty of 1762, the sole basis of all his security, is annulled; the guarantee is gone; and the Nabob, with the Company's forces in his train, falls upon him, unprotected by all guarantees, treaties, or alliances.—Thus no security whatsoever, joint or separate, old or new, is valid in his favour; and such are the principles of justice, of national honour, and

of fidelity to engagements, of those who have the confidence to talk of public faith *.

Having thus disposed of the first ground of justification of the invasion of Tanjore, by the faction of Mahomed Ali, in 1771, I pass to the second reason assigned for their violence, namely—The non-payment of the Pishcush, or tribute-money, due to the Mogul for his use, and payable through the hands of Mahomed Ali by the treaty of 1762.

On this, as on the former charge, the fact of the refusal should be first settled; because it is the foundation of the whole complaint: but, as usual with the Nabob's friends, no such proof is attempted. *Some delay* of payment there certainly was; which, on comparing circumstances, as well as they can be discovered through the Nabob's fraudulent relation of the matter, could not be above three months at the utmost beyond the stated time. But whatever it might be, it is certain that the King of Tanjore never denied the Mogul's tribute to be due. All he claimed was some remission, or at least a respite of payment; and he claimed it upon the following facts and principles:

First, That he had sent aids, in the war of Hyder Ali, to the Nabob and the Company, at a very heavy charge, which had exhausted his treasures †.

* Confid. P. 64. "It destroys what ought to be their dearest, as it is their most essential consideration, *their Public Faith*.—Is private credit sacred?—certainly and necessarily so:—On the same principle, but infinitely a larger scale, *ought Public Faith to be preserved inviolate.*"

† Company's Appendix P. 564 and 567.

Secondly,

Secondly, That his country had been eaten up by the emigration of vast multitudes of Mahomed Ali's subjects from Trichinopoly, and the adjacent parts "for twenty country leagues," who fled from the superiority of the Mysorean army, and were maintained in his country, and at his expence *. He makes those, with his own subjects, to amount to ten millions of souls, all to be maintained in the country of Tanjore. This account, notwithstanding the amazing populousness of India, may possibly be exaggerated. The number, however, of the Nabob's fugitives was certainly very great; and coming upon a country so very much peopled as Tanjore, in such circumstances as Tanjore then was, must have been an heavy burthen.

Thirdly and lastly, The Rajah alledged, that he was entitled to some allowance; as the country of Tanjore was, without any quarrel of his own, wasted by Hyder Ali, whose evacuation of it, he had been obliged to purchase with a very heavy ransom †.

These were the grounds upon which the Rajah requested some abatement of his payments. The request was plausible, if the allegations were true; and they formed a very just claim for some sort of indemnification. — If not true, it behoved Mahomed Ali to shew the falshood of them; it behoved the Presidency, as guarantees of the treaty of 1762, and if not as guarantees, yet as men of principle and common equity, to examine into the matter. All the answer the Nabob condescends to give, with regard to the first demand, is,

* Company's Appendix, P. 614.

† Ibid. P. 615.

“ That

“ That it is not the usage of India, for superiors, when followed by their inferiors in war, to make any allowance or abatement in tribute for such extra-service.”

To the second head,—of the maintenance of his refugees, he makes no answer at all.

As to the last, he thinks that as the Rajah has found so much to pay to an enemy, he ought to pay a great deal more to a friend.

To consider the Nabob's first plea,—The usage of India, to make no abatement in tribute for extra-services. The direct contrary being alledged by the King of Tanjore, and this being one of the points in issue, the Nabob ought to have proved his plea. An usage which contradicted a principle so very consonant to justice and reason, ought to be made perfectly clear, before a war is to be undertaken on the ground of such a custom. But the Nabob never pretended to prove it, and was never called upon to prove either that, or any thing else; His desires were always regarded as reasons, and his assertions were always considered as evidence. But the matter is still worse, for they receive the Nabob's assertions as proofs, even where they do not themselves so much as pretend to give credit to them. It is with pain I find myself obliged to recite the manner of proceeding, and the opinions of that Presidency, on the merits of their own war, made in support of the Nabob's extraordinary claim, to refuse payment for the services he receives. “ * This *may* be true (say they) though it is

* Company's Appendix, Page 939.

“ ascertained

“ ascertained by *no better testimony than the Nabob's*. We believe
 “ it to be the custom to allow Batta even to the troops of those
 “ Rajahs and Polygars *who are in absolute subjection*.” They
 have, according to themselves, nothing in favour of the claim
 but the Nabob's assertion; the contrary of which they believe
 to be true, *viz.* that it is the custom to make an allowance
 even where the parties are in absolute subjection, which they
 more than insinuate not to be the situation of the King of
 Tanjore*.

On the second head, of the King of Tanjore's counter-charge, I have just observed, that as the Nabob had given no explanation, none was called for. So that on all European rules of evidence, the ground of the King of Tanjore's demand, on account of the expence of maintaining such immense bodies of the Nabob's fugitive subjects, is perfectly established, and he ought to have had full credit for it.

As to the third head, of the King of Tanjore's counter-charges—His forced payment to Hyder Ali, and his losses from that invasion — no attempt being made to deny or to evade this, any more than the second allegation, instead of its being made a pretext for hostility, it ought to have been admitted as a ground of repayment, or allowance in account.
 “ He did †” say the Presidency (in a style of crimination)

* The King of Tanjore had, some years before, received an allowance for part of his charges at Madura. The Tondé man had received the same, by the Nabob's confession. The usage was, undoubtedly, the very reverse of the Nabob's state of it.

† Company's Appendix, P. 685.

“ furnish provisions and pay a sum of money to Hyder, when
 “ he entered the Carnatic in the beginning of 1769. But in
 “ this he *did no more than other Polygars, who paid money to save*
 “ *their particular districts from ravages, and which has not been al-*
 “ *ledged against them as a crime.*” — The conclusion which they
 draw from hence is striking :—“ *However, we have not been in-*
 “ *fluenced in his favour by any of these considerations ; and have*
 “ sufficiently explained in other places, our intention of call-
 “ ing him to account *at a proper and safe time.*” In plain
 English it is this,—that though the King of Tanjore had done
 no more than others, who paid their money to save their
 country from the ravages of an enemy, and to whom it never
 was imputed as a crime, yet they declare, as earnestly as if
 they were excusing themselves from some heavy imputation,
 that his innocence has with them no influence in his favour ;
 but that, instead of making him the allowance he claims for
 the injuries he had suffered, they will call him to an account
 for those sufferings, as for offences, *when they can safely do it.*
 This is a strain of justice suitable to the occasion. It is there-
 fore no wonder that they fell in so readily with the Nabob’s
 reasoning — That because the King of Tanjore has been com-
 pelled to pay great sums to enemies, not of his own, but of
 the Nabob’s creating, he therefore ought, *a fortiori*, to pay
 larger sums to the Nabob himself, as a friend. The extreme
 pride, insolence, and levity of the Nabob, manifested in this
 mode of reasoning, towards a sufferer, from the effects of his
 unjust wars and wanton ambition, render him undeserving of

any sort of answer, though very deserving of the most extreme punishment ;—but our punishments are reserved for something else than delinquency.

But let us suppose the Rajah entitled, on a scrutiny, to no indemnity ; yet, who has ever heard, before the date of this cruel and perfidious transaction, that war has been made on any power, because he had remained some short space, in arrear of a payment, offering at the same time to set it off, by countercharges to ten times the amount of the sum desired to be abated, and when the truth of no one of these countercharges had been so much as discussed ? A mere delay on such grounds could not be a crime, unless all discussion, and all attempts at an account, are crimes.

The King of Tanjore had hitherto, for a very great part of the time, been tolerably punctual in his payment ; he had sometimes even paid in advance ; This he alledged, and his allegation was never denied. A person who sometimes pays in advance, is fairly entitled in his turn to a respite ; and rigour with him is unpardonable. Mahomed Ali ought to have considered his own case. He was himself a debtor*. So far from having paid his debts by advance to the Company, he had, in the course of the transaction, received a thousand remonstrances on his delays ; nay, he has gone so far as to declare, that in case of any troubles in his country he would

* “ Above 30 lacks of principal money, which they (the Company) hazarded for his safety, and the defence of his government.” Company’s App. P. 687.

make no payments at all. No troubles, however, in a country, no losses, no sufferings, are pleadable against *him*. But Mahomed Ali is entitled to that equity which he has denied to others. Would all his reiterated delays and squabbles, and the discussion of so many accounts for so many years, have justified the making war upon him, and deposing him? certainly not. Nobody ever contended for subjecting him to a rule so rigorous, though of his own making.

But there were other considerations, which, if not with him, ought to have had weight with the English in his interest. The Company had been themselves in the situation with regard to the Rajah, in which the Rajah stood with regard to the Nabob: they had agreed to pay a pishcush or tribute to the King of Tanjore, for the town of Devicota. It was, besides, in comparison of the importance of the object, but small. This pishcush however, they had not only not paid in advance, but were at one time five years in arrear. What was their conduct to the Rajah, and his to them, on that occasion of their delay of payment to him? Without more than discharging the arrear; without pleading great expences and losses in his wars, and indeed without any plea, they request a discharge from him of the whole original obligation. Did the Rajah make war upon them for this? The Rajah very kindly and gracefully gives them an immediate acquittal of the tribute for ever. “* As you solicited very much to be

* Company's Append. P. 43. King of Tanjore's Letter to the Presidency, Nov. 4, 1764.

“ excused paying the pishcush concerning Devicota, and as
 “ I esteem the Company’s friendship to be best ; and in order
 “ that the amity and union between them and my govern-
 “ ment may, in a perfect manner, be established on a firm
 “ and lasting footing, I have, agreeable to your desire, con-
 “ sented that the said pishcush be remitted.” This was the
 language of the King of Tanjore to the Company, then his
 debtor.

If the very ideas of equity, gratitude, and even common
 decency, had not been driven from our whole conduct in India,
 some degree of shame and compunction must have arisen at the
 recollection of this act of generosity, when, to gratify the
 avarice and ambition of others, and perhaps our own, a
 civilized nation made such haste to pillage the goods of their
 neighbour and benefactor, and to spill the blood of their in-
 nocent fellow-creatures ;—but there is more than enough said
 on so very clear a point.

There remains only to examine the last pretext for this in-
 human quarrel ;—That the Rajah had made war on the
 Princes or Polygars of Marawar and Nalcooty ; persons de-
 pendent (as he alledged) on the Nabob of Arcot.—The fact
 of the Rajah’s having made war on those princes, is true. But
 have those who make it a charge, attempted to shew that he
 was unjust and unreasonable in that war ?—not a single word
 on the subject.

It is a right inherent in every sovereign power, to seek re-
 dress by arms from those who, he conceives, have injured him.

The sovereignty of the King of Tanjore is admitted by the Presidency themselves, even so late as in their consultation of 16th November 1772. In the debate on the Nabob's titles, they say, “ * That the Rajah of Tanjore, till his late humiliation [in 1771] certainly never considered himself as a *dependent* on the Nabob; he held himself *equal* to him at least. He paid, 'tis true, an acknowledgment yearly to the *Empire*, but considered the Nabob as no more than the *deputy*, the *officer of that empire*, authorized to receive that acknowledgment; while he, the Rajah, held his kingdom *by inheritance*, and exercised every act of *independent sovereignty* in it. It might rather have been expected, that he would have assumed a character of *superior* dignity to that of the Nabob, whose office is constitutionally revocable at pleasure.”

The King of Tanjore had, long before the date of that recognition of his independence, been stated by the Presidency (that is in their Letter to the Nabob of 31st May 1762) † as a sovereign Prince.—The Nabob himself admits it in his answer; repeating verbatim the very words of the letter, and agreeing to act in conformity to the advice given in consequence of the principle of sovereignty then stated to him from Madras. It is thus expressed in his own letter: “ ‡ As the King of Tanjore is a *sovereign Prince*, it is

* Company's Appendix, Vol. I. P. 479:

† Ibid. Vol. I. P. 59.

‡ Ibid. P. 61.

“ neither

“ neither your interest nor mine to enter into a war, and that
 “ you intend *therefore* to act as a *mediator* between us ; desir-
 “ ing me at the same time to look upon Mr. Dupre as your
 “ representative, and give him the necessary instructions, *all*
 “ *which I observe very fully*. Mr. Dupre having arrived here,
 “ *informed me very fully* of your message. As you are my friend
 “ in every respect, I regard your advice to be best ; for which
 “ reason I have wrote a letter to the King of Tanjore ex-
 “ actly to the form inclosed.”

Thus the sovereignty of the King of Tanjore is established beyond a doubt, by the confession of those who acted against him, and even by the confession of the Nabob himself ; and of consequence he had a right to do himself justice.

But he was a party in the cause, say the gentlemen of Madras, and ought not to act as a judge in it. It is not necessary to prove to these gentlemen, that to be at once a judge and a party, though incompatible with a state of subjection, is an incident inseparable from sovereign power.—It is natural to ask, what treaty or what law derogated from his sovereignty, and hindered the King of Tanjore from righting himself on his neighbours ? So far from being restrained by the treaty of 1762, it was then provided, that he should be at full liberty to act against certain Polygars, not indeed there named, but who could be no other than those in question ; as with them alone he had any discussion. The Nabob himself (the standing evidence against his own pretensions) some years before, and that too with great earnestness, actually applied

to

to the Presidency, and intreated (for many good reasons which he assigns) that those Polygars might have no manner of protection. “ * This day, being Thursday the 20th March, “ *Manozey* (the King of Tanjore’s minister) and *Tondeman*, “ have sent their Vakeels, and with a *great deal* of *displeasure* “ have acquainted me in the manner following, viz.

“ We have been your Allies from a long time, and exerted “ ourselves to the utmost *in the time of the troubles*; we “ used our endeavours, and *supplied the fort with provisions* “ *with very great pain and trouble*, in return for which you “ have protected the Marawar (against our interest) and “ hindered us from *retaking the district, which he had possessed,* “ *to the prejudice of our honour.* If so, we shall be under the “ necessity of joining the Mysorean, to do what we can, and “ *to quit our alliance with you.* Should the Circar troops, or “ those of the English, assist the Marawar, we shall *be obliged* “ *to fight them.*”

After reciting this spirited message, which had very little the style of subordination, much less subjection, the Nabob proceeds: “ I must observe to you, that the King of Tanjore “ and Tondeman are *neighbours* † to the fort of Trichino- “ poly, who *both assisted with provisions in the time of the war* “ *and troubles*, which supported the people in the fort. If “ we act the part of an enemy against them, it will be “ attended with a difficulty to defend the fort, *as we shall* “ *not be able then to get even a grain of provision, which will*

* Company’s Appendix, Vol. I. P. 39 and 40.

† Not dependents on it, as he afterwards thought proper to assert.

“ render me unable to reside here with my family. I have before
 “ and now, wrote to Colonel Heron on this head to the
 “ following purport :

“ The Marawar acted as *an enemy* for these five or six years
 “ past—we never reaped any advantage from him—we should
 “ not lose the King of Tanjore and Tondeman by giving
 “ our protection to the Marawar ; *the support of the fort of*
 “ *Trichinopoly depends upon their friendship.*

“ I am sensible that your order will be obeyed, and there-
 “ fore made bold to trouble you with this, hoping that you
 “ will write to the Colonel as soon as possible, *to quit his*
 “ *protection to the Marawar*, and to settle Tinnevelly. If the
 “ Marawar joins the French and the Mysoreans, it is no
 “ matter, for we can receive the Circar’s money of him at
 “ another time, or the King of Tanjore will answer for it.
 “ The reason of my taking so *great care to avoid the animosity*
 “ *of the King and Tondeman*, is, that formerly the country of
 “ Trichinopoly remained in our possession ; then we had no
 “ occasion to expect provisions from other districts, but now,
 “ as the Mysorean is in possession of the said country, we
 “ must *depend* upon these, viz. The King of Tanjore and
 “ Tondeman’s *friendship* for provisions. I acquainted you
 “ with what I thought was proper advice. My hope and
 “ dependence is on your honour ; you will do whatever may
 “ be beneficial to me *.”

* In the correspondence, Comp. App. No. V. much more appears, which
 shews how much the Nabob encouraged the King of Tanjore in his pretensions
 on the Marawar.

By this letter (and it is not the only letter to the same effect) we see the Nabob not only consenting, but most desirous and earnest, that no protection should be given to the Marawar Princes. He recites the complaints of the King of Tanjore and Tondeman, which are in an high style of *displeasure*. Not a word, not a hint, either on their part, or on the Nabob's, of any sort of dependency or subjection. Their connection is treated by them, and not controverted by him, *as an alliance* only, which they threaten to withdraw from him, in case of his continuing to assist their enemies. This assistance, it must be remarked, he does not deny to have given, notwithstanding the obligations conferred on him by the King and by the Prince of Tonde, which he here acknowledges, and which he is so much in dread of not receiving in future, on account of his treacherous behaviour. Afterwards, when the Nabob, in that series of wars made for him by the Company, undertook an expedition against Madura, (which by the way he afterwards declared to be undertaken “ * without the least reason,”) “ † At that time the Nabob *requested* Monagee, “ (General to the King of Tanjore) to assist him in his expedition, and *desired* the General to defer his design until “ that affair was over, and *then to clear his country*. To this “ end he also prevailed on Mr. Lawrence to intercede in his “ favour.”

* Company's Append. P. 1507. Nabob's Letter to the Directors, 5th Feb. 1770. “ Afterwards *they obliged me, without the least reason, to take the field against Ufoff Khân at Madura.*”

† Ibid. 681.

Here the Nabob not only knows of the war of the King of Tanjore against the Polygars, but consents to it; he acknowledges its justice by calling the territories in dispute *his* [the King of Tanjore's] *country*, and the operations for obtaining them *clearing* it: and he only begs that expedition to be postponed on account of the assistance he himself desired from Tanjore in the war he had embarked in “without the least “reason” against Madura; but which assistance he is so far from thinking himself entitled to command by his authority, that he calls in the aid of Mr. Lawrence’s interest to obtain it.

Although the Nabob thought fit to desist, or to appear to desist for a time from his treacherous management with the Polygars, we find him pursuing the same clandestine course to incite these Polygars to hostilities, at the very time that he was preparing to make war on the King of Tanjore for having a quarrel with them. “* He proposed that we should disband “some of our Seapoys, to the end they might be *secretly* enlisted by the Marawars; and that he would *instigate* the great “Marawar, Tondeman, and Travencore, and other Polygars, “to unite against Tanjore; and that he should order his people from the Madura and Tinnevelly countries to assist.”— This is the constant insidious course of the Nabob with regard to all his neighbours, fomenting disputes amongst them, to end in the common destruction of them all.

It is needless to contrast this course with the conduct of the

* Company’s Appendix, P. 652. Select Committee, 12th Feb. 1771.

Rajah. It is perfectly known in what a moderate and equitable manner he terminated these wars in which he was victorious, and which the Nabob admitted to be just; by receiving very moderate compensations, and by mutual marriages, according to the usages of a mild and civilized people, the object of whose wars is satisfaction, and not extermination.—Very different was the spirit of the wars afterwards carried on, by the Nabob, against both of the unhappy litigant parties in this dispute: For the Nabob has actually exterminated those Polygars, and is now overwhelmed with grief, and calls on our compassion for meeting obstructions in the like pious design of destroying the King of Tanjore.

If it should be still concluded, that these Polygars, being dependents on the Nabob, could not be attacked without his leave; — to this there are very plain and conclusive answers. I have just shewn that if his leave were necessary, the King of Tanjore had his leave: but to go deeper, I must observe, first, that the Nabob must prove that the Polygars of Marawar were, or ought to be, his dependents. On this point, the Presidency did think fit to institute *some* enquiry; and the result of it was, that there was *no proof of their dependency*, any farther than the transient prevalence of force, by which the powers in India have alternately robbed each other, according to the measure of that force, without any plea of right or pretence of claim. The *independent authority* of the several Polygars in their several districts, was *ancient and hereditary*, and not derived from
the

the Nabob or any one else *. He claimed their dependency in virtue of his possession of Trichinopoly, which he had usurped from an usurper, and (if it was our business to enquire into titles) holds at this hour from the rightful owner. The King of Tanjore also claimed, something like their dependence, upon probably not a much better foundation. The Presidency themselves state the matter right, when they say, "*That constitutionally they are independent of both †.*" Very ready they were, when weak and oppressed, to acknowledge any superior, and as willing to renounce all dependence when they were at ease and liberty, none indeed having any natural or just superiority over them. But the Nabob's paternal care and attention to these Polygars will be considered hereafter. It will then appear how much this injury to his dependents was the true cause of the war on the King of Tanjore, when I come to the proceedings of 1773; which proceedings, I flatter myself, will appear to stand upon no better arguments, than those which have been fully and satisfactorily refuted with regard to the war of 1771.

The success of the war of 1771, as the Rajah was much weaker than the confederacy, and was taken unprovided of any alliance, was very different from what its merits deserved. Tanjore, after the blood of its inhabitants had been freely drawn (upon the pretexts we have been just examining) and the country plundered, was obliged to submit to a ransom not much short of £. 700,000 sterling, and nearly to

* Company's App. P. 662, 680, 681. † Ibid. 682.

such other terms as the Nabob thought proper to exact. This gave rise to a treaty, signed and sealed by the parties before the walls of Tanjore.

SECTION V.

Breach of the first treaty of 1771 — Pretences for that breach examined — Account of the matter as given by the Nabob's Sons and Minister — Breach of the second treaty of 1771 — Principle of their construction of treaties — The character assumed by the Presidency, to enable them to evade treaties.

THE treaty with Tanjore, as we have seen, was formally concluded: but such was the condition of that unhappy country, that the duration of the treaty had no longer period, than until orders could arrive from the Nabob and the gentlemen at Madrafs, for annulling it. The author of the Considerations is not ashamed publicly to set forth facts, which shew, that the English did then instigate the Nabob to a most flagrant breach of the treaty, and almost instantly after its execution wrote to their General to that effect. Nothing can better explain the character of the proceedings of the Presidency than their own words, and I insert them as they are given in their own pamphlet: “* As the best means

* Considerations, Pages 23, 24, and 25.

“ therefore under these circumstances *to parry the mischiefs*
 “ *of an accommodation*, they represented to the Nabob the
 “ necessity of pursuing the line of conduct set forth in the
 “ subsequent extracts.”

“ Our apprehensions arising from a peace so suddenly
 “ concluded, and upon terms which appear to us *so insecure*,
 “ rendered it necessary that we should take every possible
 “ precaution, as if we were *actually on the eve of a war*; a
 “ letter was accordingly wrote to General Smith to that
 “ effect. *By one of the articles of the treaty, the fort of Vel-*
 “ *lum was either to be restored to the Rajah, or to be destroyed.*
 “ As this was a fort of the utmost importance, being in a
 “ manner a key to Tanjore, the Nabob, *by our desire*, sent
 “ positive orders to his Son, *on no account to deliver it up*
 “ *without his express direction*. It was indeed the only tie we
 “ had on the Rajah for his performance of his engage-
 “ ments. As it would require a considerable time to demo-
 “ lish it, if it were resolved to do so, by reason of its great
 “ extent, we directed General Smith to leave in it a *suf-*
 “ *ficient garrison* of the Company's troops, with a proper
 “ quantity of stores for its defence, *and on no account to*
 “ *deliver it up without our express orders*. In the mean time
 “ we advised the Nabob to instruct his Son to require *punc-*
 “ *tual performance of every article of the agreement*. The Ra-
 “ jah had engaged to pay certain sums of money, and deliver
 “ up certain jewels and other effects taken from the Ma-
 “ rawar, which it is *probable he meant not to accomplish*. It
 “ therefore

“ therefore seemed very justifiable, *in case of failure, to recom-*
 “ *mence hostilities*; and hostilities recommenced on such grounds
 “ would *disannul the whole agreement*, and leave the parties at
 “ liberty to insist on *fresh conditions* on either side. The
 “ Nabob’s Son was therefore instructed, in case this should
 “ happen, to demand, as a *sine qua non*, the cession of the
 “ fort of Vellum. As we *conjectured, so it proved*—The Ra-
 “ jah *equivocated*; our guns had not been drawn out of the bat-
 “ *teries*; dispositions were made for recommencing hostilities;
 “ a fresh *negociation* ensued; the fort of Vellum, with the
 “ districts of Coiladdy and Elangad were demaded, and
 “ formally ceded by the Rajah.” This is the account given
 by the parties themselves of this unparalleled breach of faith,
 and their motives to it.

The effect to the King of Tanjore, of the conclusion of a
 peace with the Nabob, was, that in that very instant he found
 himself “ on the eve of a war with the Company.” It had
 been agreed to restore the fort of Vellum, or to demolish
 it; but orders were sent, “ on no account to deliver it up;”
 instead of demolishing it, “ it is ordered to be sufficiently
 “ garrisoned;” and pretences are to be sought for disannulling
 the whole agreement, and enforcing fresh conditions. But
 the most extraordinary strain of their reasoning is this—They
 find the terms of the treaty inconvenient to the Nabob, and
 too advantageous to the King of Tanjore, and therefore they
 presume it “ *probable* that he (the King of Tanjore) did not
 “ mean to accomplish them;” and as most fortunately, every
 thing

thing agreeable to their wishes turns out according to their conjectures,—“ the *Rajah equivocated*,” the treaty is gone, they open their batteries—Vellum is surrendered to them; and to make it of sufficient weight, two valuable districts are added.

The gentlemen have not been at the pains of telling us what the *equivocation* was, that proved so advantageous to them, and that fell in so aptly with their occasions and predictions. If the reader is not already nauseated with the grossness of these frauds, and the barbarity of these violences, he will think it worth his while to consider, whether they, who hoped for the annulling of a treaty in order to extract new and larger terms, were not far more likely to *equivocate*, than he whose interest it was to keep them confined to the original agreement? The reader will judge, whether those, who from the cannon's mouth had dictated a treaty in the breach of the walls of his capital, and had kept the batteries, which had reduced him to capitulate, still pointed, were not more likely to *equivocate* for their own advantage, than the unhappy besieged Prince, who could get nothing but additional oppressions by litigating or chicaning with a force, which on the instant he had found irresistible.

It is not from any necessity of proving the futility of the pretences used for this breach of faith, that I proceed further in the detail of this affair. They are not even plausible. But I dwell a little upon it, in order that from this particular affair, the reader may be furnished with an idea of the spirit

of all their proceedings. The Presidency (in their Letter just quoted) tell us, that the King of Tanjore was obliged by the treaty to pay certain sums of money, and to deliver up to the Nabob certain * jewels taken from the Marawar, which “ it was probable, he *did not mean to accomplish* ;” and that, on the demand of them, “ the Rajah *equivocated*.” Unfortunately for them, in their story of the equivocation, the Nabob’s own Minister, then in the camp, Nazib Khân, tells quite another tale. He informs his master, that those jewels (which were not worth above 3,000 pounds) were actually delivered to the Nabob’s eldest Son, but that He, having then had his orders to break the treaty, immediately returned them. As to the money which “ it was *probable* the King of Tanjore did not mean to pay ;” unluckily also for this *probability*, the same Minister informs the Nabob, that on the day of the delivery of the jewels, the King of Tanjore had offered bills, at forty-five days, for the sum of nine lacks, out of fourteen agreed to be paid ; and it was settled that the remaining sum should be paid on the Monday following ; and in consequence the King of Tanjore claimed that the batteries before the place should be demolished.

The fairness of this proceeding on the one hand, and the strict orders from the Nabob and the Presidency not to fulfil the terms, threw the eldest Son of the Nabob, Umdut Ul

* It is impossible to go into the detail of all the complicated violences of the Nabob, or it might be shewn that there was no colour of justice in the claim of these jewels.

Omrah, into the greatest perplexity and distress. This virtuous Prince (whom the Durbar politics never fail to treat with disrespect) was not instantly able, even under this overbearing authority, to bring his mind to the uncoloured breach of a treaty perfectly concluded and settled, but a week after the ratification. Nazib Khân expresses the thing in a very natural manner: “ He (the young Nabob) was greatly perplexed at the perusal of its *particular* contents, [contents of the Nabob’s letter] *and of course he considered from morning till ten o’clock at night in order to break the peace.* He likewise consulted with the General about it*.”

It is no wonder that a mind not broken in by frequent acts of perfidy, should spend a long time in such a deliberation. It is probable he might have deliberated to this day, before he could have found a plausible pretext, if his younger brother, the Emir Madur Ul Mulk, a person of great vigour of mind and ample resources, and one who supplied by natural talents his want of experience in these matters, had not come to his assistance. This young, manly politician decided the affair by arguments altogether worthy of the occasion. No narrative of the transaction can be so satisfactory as his own; it is in his letter to his Father, the Nabob: “ † As the “ said Behauder” (meaning his eldest brother) “ had *lately* “ *fixed his seal* to the agreement paper, he was *hesitating a* “ *little* upon it; I then told him, *He must not look upon his* “ *agreement*, but that he should be always mindful to observe

* Company’s Appendix. P. 914.

† P. 907.

“ *your Excellency's pleasure ;*” and he adds, “ that if that article (the cession of Vellum, &c.) be not inserted in the treaty, *it was no matter*, but now some *fresh demands* must be specified and obtained.” This, it must be confessed, was a free and easy way of proceeding. When it was objected to this worthy offspring of the Nabob, that before the peace every means had been used to persuade the King of Tanjore to give up the fortresses and territories, which they now resolved to force from him after the peace ; the young great man, instead of looking about for pitiful excuses, like his advocate, “ desired him to remember the proverb, That if a man *insists upon another man's life*, he will suffer the *pains of agony* rather than part with it ;” and thus he concludes the Rajah would submit to suffer the pains of agony in quitting his territory, secured to him by the last peace, when his life was insisted on as the alternative. Accordingly he sent in fresh proposals, and threatened to renew the fire in case of non-compliance ; which being told to the King of Tanjore, by *various ways and means*. (I use his own expression) this unfortunate Prince was obliged to forego the treaty he had just made. It was in vain that the Tanjore Ambassador urged the faith of the treaty.—“ * It is to be remarked (says the Emir) that the Tanjore Vakeel argued with me very much at the time of our carrying our demands, saying, that as *the treaty was already given under our seal*, it was not proper to advance *fresh demands*.” This argument

* Company's Appendix. P. 907.

did indeed seem somewhat reasonable ; but the young Prince preserving exactly the same style of magnanimity to the disputing Vakeel, which he had before used to his hesitating elder brother, gave the two following answers in lieu of all reason * ; and he thus describes it in his narrative to his Father : “ That an order arrived from your Excellency’s Court ; “ that they *should by all means preserve your pleasure, if not, “ the war will be renewed.*” Here was no equivocation ; no speculation of future breach of faith on the side of the Rajah ; no talk of refusal of jewels, payments, &c.—Do this or die !—was the only argument, colour, or pretext.

The young statesman very naturally valued himself not a little on his success in this resolute measure ; and to recommend his endeavours, puts his Father in mind again of the difficulties from the treaty.—“ *Your Excellency (says he) is very sensible of the agreement made before.*” It is no wonder that his Father was so well pleased with him. He had torn away, in spite of that agreement, the fortresses of Vellum, Coiladdy, and Elangad, the keys not only of the force, but the sustenance, of the King of Tanjore. That he should be bountifully rewarded was natural. But the hardship was, that the poor King of Tanjore should be obliged to reward him for this extraordinary service. After all other payments, he made him a present of 12,500 pounds sterling, which I suppose, as usual, was obtained by *various ways and means.*

In this manner was broke, after a week’s existence, the

* Company’s Appendix, Page 907.

first treaty of 1771. A second treaty was entered into, in which, as we have seen, *the Nabob's pleasure was preserved*. They had got every thing they thought proper to ask; they had got the place which they contended for, as security, and a great deal more. The Nabob's treaty-breaking and treaty-making Son, declares it to be a “* thousand times “ better than what was heretofore made.” Still however, they were, it seems, as insecure as ever. The resources indeed of their insecurity, were inexhaustible. In the instance before us they had found it *probable*, that the King did not *mean* to keep the treaty which they thought proper to break in the manner we have seen. When they had found it convenient that the treaty of 1769 should be broken, they said, “† That should the King of Tanjore persist in demanding an “ abatement in the Pishcush due, on account of his late “ charges, it would *furnish* us with a *just pretext to accuse* “ him of a breach of his engagements, and to take our “ measures accordingly.”

The expression of “*just pretexts*,” is remarkable; these are words that have, I believe, never met together before. Justice had in fact as little connection with their actions, as the English language will suffer to exist between the words *just* and *pretexts*. Those who shew themselves so desirous of *pretexts* for war, and so hopeful of obtaining them, are seldom disappointed in their views; accordingly, as they found pretexts twice in 1771, it was not likely that they should be

* Company's Appendix, P. 907.

† Considerations, P. 14.

destitute

destitute of them not quite two years after, in 1773. What these *just pretexts* were, we shall see ; it is the author's " grand " and important period," and as such we shall treat it.

This author tell us, That at this period the gentlemen of the Presidency *, " were thrown by the Nabob's treaty with " the King of Tanjore, *into a situation of extreme delicacy* ; involving at once the considerations of policy and the faith of " treaty *acceded to* by their ally."

The considerations of policy are not our present business. The embarrassment of the gentlemen arose evidently from the *faith* of the treaty, which it must be admitted is frequently very embarrassing to people's policy. Mahomed Ali had but two years before concluded a solemn treaty with the King of Tanjore ; he had concluded it on just the terms he thought proper himself to dictate. This author pleases to say, that the Nabob *acceded to it*. If this were true, his accession to it bound him to observe it. The distinction, if it were founded, would do nothing in his favour ; for he who accedes, becomes a party from that moment, and all parties are bound.—But the fact is, He originally, as a principal, *made* the treaty, and could not accede to it, as there were no other parties to the treaty than himself and the Rajah of Tanjore. But he wished to get himself loose ; and the question was, the manner of doing it. The treaty was clear ; it was recent ; it was a new edition corrected, amended, and enlarged, at his own desire, and at the *instance* of the Presidency—He had

* Considerations, P. 26.

acquired immense sums and important territories by it. Thus circumstanced, the violation of the treaty was really distressing to his delicacy; but the grounds of proceeding had been laid, which must prevent any difficulties, that treaties could put in the way, from becoming absolutely unfurmountable.

The reader must remember the evasions which the Presidency happily invented to get rid of the treaty of 1769. *They had made* the treaty, and were bound by it; but they had the discretion to keep the Nabob *in reserve*, who (as they said) never ratified it, and he therefore was not in the same shackles. In consequence of this freedom of the Nabob, in 1771 he made war upon the Rajah; and the Company, (who did as confederates what for all the world they would not have done as principals) appeared as his allies; and their irresistible armies swept all before them. In 1773 the time was come, when the good office relative to the treaty of 1769, was to be requited to the Nabob by one of the same kind; for now the Nabob, in his turn, had most unluckily got into the trammels of a treaty. The Presidency, at the time of this treaty, notwithstanding it was made according to their express directions, had cautiously, “ considering themselves in the character of *Guardians* of the peace of the Carnatic, *as well as* “ of the *Nabob's rights*,” judged it requisite to keep aloof; and as the author expresses it, “ * *declined* a ratification of the “ treaty; and, to awe the Rajah into the performance of his “ stipulations, they held themselves in readiness to *recommence*

* Considerations, Page 26.

“ *hostilities*,

“ *hostilities*, till they should receive *solid and convincing proofs*
 “ *of the sincerity of his intentions.*”

At this crisis, the position which they took was most extraordinary ; They were neither parties to the treaty, nor ratifiers of it, nor guarantees ; — but they were stationed *to awe* the Rajah (a sort of scare-crow) and to be ready to *recommence hostilities* in case he should not be sincere in those engagements, in which they would have no share. It is plain that there was something in the written obligation of a treaty likely to be very inconsistent with the part they were resolved to act ; for on any other principle it is hard to tell, why, if the convention was no convention of theirs, they were so engaged to keep themselves armed to enforce it : or if, on the contrary, the object of the treaty was pressing on them in point either of policy or justice, it is impossible to explain how they came not formally to ratify and guaranty it, as they had done the treaty of 1762, which first settled them in the character of guarantee. This character of guarantee would have given them a far more clear, and equitable, and solid right of interference, than the new character of an *armed bystander prepared to recommence hostilities*, which they thought fit to create for their own use. But the reason for this conduct is plain. By having a better and more respectable title, they would at the same time have stood in a more limited capacity ; and in a capacity too that, we see by their letter to the Directors of 28th Feb. 1772, was the most abhorrent from the Nabob's views and wishes..

wishes.—“ * By that expedition, *viz.* that of 1771, he hoped
 “ and obtained what he earnestly wished for, *viz.* the remo-
 “ val of that restraint which he thought himself under by the Com-
 “ pany’s guarantee of 1762.” One would think that a power-
 ful and friendly guarantee to a treaty of one’s own dictating,
 would be a most desirable thing : yet the Nabob, who could do
 nothing without their forces, trembled at their guarantee. The
 reason is evident ; That instrument must go to Europe, and
 would stand an evidence of his and our agreement ; and such
 an agreement must bind him and us to something or other :
 whereas the gentlemen at Madrafs, in their new capacity, and
 in those ample and indefinite terms of “ guardians of peace,”
 and “ guardians of rights,” were under no restraint what-
 ever ; and there was nothing they or the Nabob wished to
 do, for which they could not find abundance of *their* just
 pretexts.

Here then, instead of sneaking (as in the transaction of
 1769) the humble retainers and followers of the Nabob,
 they appear in the lofty character of *guardians* of the peace
 of the Carnatic, as well as the *Nabob’s rights*. As his guar-
 dians, they took care that the agreement concluded by their
 pupil himself, to the prejudice of his own rights, could not
 bind him (on account I suppose of his minority,) “ † They
 “ therefore” (and it is the great advantage of playing the game
 of fast and loose) “ under this dilemma, *agreed* to an armistice ;
 “ for it cannot be deemed an *absolute termination* of the war.”

* Company’s Appendix, P. 1116.

† Considerations, P. 26.

Certainly not ; for upon their principle nothing could end that, or any war that Mahomed Ali should choose to carry on.

It is not denied however, that it purported in terms to be an absolute peace. Two treaties, the last of them made under their own directions, in a single year, were not sufficient to put an end to the war. They employ for this purpose a distinction of notable service to them, though not hitherto much employed in the *corps diplomatique*. They do not *ratify*, they only *agree* to the treaty ; and in their system, a man is not to be bound to that which he agrees to. This invention, as a very ingenious refinement, will have its due praise ; and if it be generally adopted, will free politicians from very great *embarrassment*. They did however (they admit) in some way or other, *agree* to that treaty ; they received some benefit too by the agreement ; for they did, or ought to have obtained for the Company, out of the spoils of the Rajah, a present from the Nabob of ten lacks of pagodas, or £. 400,000 sterling. The taking this money, though it was it seems no ratification, yet it is something very like receiving the equivalent for one : yet neither the Nabob's treaty, nor their agreement, nor this beneficial effect of both, was able to form an obligation that should be binding on them.

SECTION VI.

Commencement of the war of 1773—Pretexts for that war examined—Negociations with the Marattas explained—The Nabob's conquest of the Marawar and Nalcooty countries considered—The spirit of the Nabob's government—Observations on the policy of conquest in his favour, and on the settlement of India.

THE Gentlemen at Madrafs having in the manner we have seen, slipped into the hands of the unfortunate King of Tanjore, an *agreement* instead of a *ratification*, and metamorphosed a *treaty of peace* into an *armistice*; and having held themselves ever since the conclusion of the treaty in *readiness to recommence hostilities*, as *guardians of peace*; and, as *guardians of the Nabob's rights*, tolerably disposed to hear his complaints, this their dutiful ward is not long before he brings before his guardians the following complaint. I state it from the author *.

1. “ By advice confirmed by Mr. Mostyn, the Company’s
“ resident at Poonah, the Rajah had endeavoured to bring
“ the Marattas into the Carnatic.”

2. “ He not only refused to assist him with troops against the
“ Marawar and Nalcooty Zemindars, but he admitted them
“ (when defeated by the Nabob) into his own territories, and
“ assisted these rebellious subjects with men, money, powder,
“ and shot.”

* Considerations, P. 26 and 27.

3. “ He

3. “ He had taken the runaway Polygars of Worriorpollam
“ and Arielore under his protection, giving them the districts
“ of Cumcunum for a residence.”

4. “ He has, *under the plea* of borrowing money, mortgaged
“ some districts of the Tanjore country to the Dutch, *French,*
“ and the Danes.”

5. “ He has refused the money agreed for by treaty, ten
“ lacks still remaining due.”

“ The select Committee took *into serious consideration* this
“ important representation of the Nabob; and upon *ma-*
“ *turally weighing* all the facts and motives with the essen-
“ tial interests of the Company, and the rights of their
“ ally, they determine not only the justice and policy, but
“ the necessity of reassuming vigorous measures against
“ the *incorrigible* Rajah; it being evident that in the *present*
“ *system it is dangerous to have such a power* in the heart of a
“ province.”

“ As to any rights of protection under treaties, even from
“ 1762 to the present hour, it was obvious, *that he who had*
“ *violated all, had no claim to the benefits of any,* especially his
“ gross and almost instantaneous violation of the last, *inad-*
“ *vertently* indulged to him by the Nabob, had absolutely
“ forfeited every shadow of pretension; adding thereby new
“ demerit to his former delinquency, which has proved itself
“ amply sufficient to justify war.”

The Presidency were in the right very *seriously* to consider,
and very *maturely* to weigh, before they resolved that the late

treaty was broken by the King of Tanjore—That he had broken all the treaties from 1762—That all his rights to protection were forfeited—That he was to be considered as incorrigible, and—That in the present system it was dangerous to suffer him to exist as any power at all.

The propriety of seriously considering and maturely weighing, is perfectly agreeable to their own opinion. Let us see how much time they allowed themselves, and what abundant materials they provided for their serious consideration and mature deliberation.

The Nabob's letter is dated on the 18th June 1773. Their resolution is drawn and concluded on the 22d of the same month; that is, on the 4th day after the original complaint. In that time the whole was received, examined, and concluded. Never was a deliberation comprehending so many objects of fact to be inquired into, and arguments to be discussed, dispatched in so very short a time; But by this circumstance we see the benefit of the Nabob's residence at Madras (which is vaunted as one of the proofs of his good affections) by the very pleasant dispatch it gives to his affairs.

Four days, was the space of time taken for this serious consideration. What were the materials for it? Truly neither more nor less than the Nabob's own charge. One would think that in a business of this sort, some communication ought to have been made; some answer ought to have been demanded; some explanation, if not asked, ought to have been admitted. On the King of Tanjore's part it was the
rather

rather necessary, because Tanjore had been the grand leading point of Mahomed Ali's ambition, and the first object of his political manœuvres, through his whole life; and therefore this great person was a witness (a little suspicious) in his own cause *. No enquiry of this kind, or of any kind, was however made, or even pretended; no colour was laid on the proceeding; no plausible pretence was so much as affected; the Nabob's simple representation was the text, and immediate war was the comment.

What these gentlemen refused to do, I will do for them; and for the reader's satisfaction, and in a very short way, examine those famous grounds for war, one by one.

The first was Mr. Mostyn's letter from Poonah. Before any discussion of the fact, it is impossible to avoid remarking on this correspondence, that it appears rather singular, that the Company's servant, Mr. Mostyn, should not have communicated this important secret to the Presidency, his masters; and that the first explicit and direct account the

* The Presidency in their remarks, 17 July 1770, on a representation of the Nabob's, concerning a correspondence between Hyder Ali and the King of Tanjore, express their sense of the impropriety of listening with too much facility to the Nabob's evidence in his own cause; this their remark, shews at the same time the source of all the charges brought against the King of Tanjore. "That a
"correspondence has been carried on between Hyder Ali, and the Rajah of
"Tanjore, we have not the least doubt of; and that the Rajah places great de-
"pendence on the friendship of Hyder Ali, is a matter we believe equally
"certain; and which may be imputed in a great measure to the Nabob's known enmity
"towards him; and from which it is natural to suppose, the Nabob may be induced to
"exaggerate his representations with regard to the Rajah, which should make us
"cautious of forming any opinion, or adopting any measures on the Nabob's
"reports alone." Comp. App. 644.

Presidency had of it, should be through the Nabob, who is not said to have so much as produced any letter from this, his correspondent.

Besides, the letters not being produced, and therefore wholly failing as evidence, this sort of correspondence ought to have a little alarmed the Presidency, instead of proving so satisfactory to them; for it shewed that their servant had his principal correspondence with the Nabob, upon matter of infinite importance, and that his information to them was at best but secondary and superficial.

As to the negotiation at Poonah: — If the writer of this piece had thought proper to resort to his authority, the gentlemen of the Presidency, they would have given him a full explanation of the matter, in the extract of their consultation of the 22d June 1773. He is inexcusable for omitting this, as he quotes sometimes from those very consultations, leaving out however, both what goes before and what follows after the parts he uses. These omissions are not unimportant, as they immediately explain and elucidate the transaction he grounds his charge upon. They would shew how much evidence there was for the fact itself; which is only, that the intelligence communicated by the Nabob is, in *some measure* confirmed by Mr. Mostyn; and that is all. But on a supposition of the existence of such endeavours on the part of the King of Tanjore, the Presidency's own justification of him is as full as can possibly be wished; nor is it necessary for me to prove any thing more than they themselves

themselves confefs : “ * That the Nabob has *constantly* had in
 “ view the design of *conquering Tanjore*, will not admit
 “ of a doubt ; and, as the honourable Court were ad-
 “ vised by the Lord North, we are firmly persuaded, that
 “ his chief motive for concluding peace with the Rajah,
 “ at a time when our troops were upon the point of
 “ getting possession of the place, arose from his jealousy,
 “ least the Company purposed at a convenient opportunity
 “ to take the country from him. By that expedition
 “ however, he obtained what he earnestly wished for, *viz.*
 “ the removal of that restraint which he thought himself
 “ under by the Company’s guaranty of 1762. We then
 “ expressed our firm opinion, that the peace concluded with-
 “ out the intervention of the Company, would not be con-
 “ sidered by the Rajah as any security to him ; and that he
 “ would avail himself of the first opportunity of freeing himself
 “ from his apprehensions of the Nabob. *The intelligence com-*
 “ *municated to us by the Nabob*, of the Rajah’s application to
 “ the Marattas and Hyder Ali for assistance, *is in some measure*
 “ *confirmed* by the advices transmitted to us by Mr. Mostyn,
 “ from Poonah. Neither is the conduct of the Rajah in this
 “ instance to be wondered at ; the apprehensions he before had,
 “ have been increased by the publication of the Nabob’s inten-
 “ tion of reducing him, which has gained credit all over the
 “ country. He knows, that in our present situation we can-
 “ not interfere in the disputes between him and the Nabob ;

* Company’s App. Vol. I. P. 230 and 231.

“ that *the Nabob did not even allow his Vakeel to visit the late*
 “ *President*. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that
 “ the Rajah should endeavour to strengthen himself by every
 “ means in his power, to enable him to withstand any at-
 “ tempts of the Nabob against him. However, setting all
 “ these considerations aside, it is evident, that in the present
 “ system, it is dangerous to have such a power in the heart
 “ of the province: For as the honourable Court have been
 “ repeatedly advised, that unless the Company can engage
 “ the Rajah to their interest, by a firm promise of support in
 “ all his just rights; we look upon it as certain, that should
 “ any troubles arise in the Carnatic, whether from the French
 “ or a country enemy, and present a favourable opportunity
 “ of freeing himself from his apprehensions of the Nabob, he
 “ would take part against him, and at such a time might be
 “ a dangerous enemy in the South. The propriety and ex-
 “ pediency therefore, of embracing the present opportunity
 “ of reducing him entirely, before such an event takes place,
 “ or before he has strengthened himself by alliances with any
 “ other powers, are evident.”

Here is a full justification of the King of Tanjore relative
 to this negotiation at Poonah, even by those who were the in-
 struments of his ruin. It appears from this letter, that the
 negotiation (if it at all existed) had arisen from a just dread
 of the Nabob's insincerity, of his implacable enmity, and of his
 constancy to his prime object of making a conquest of the
 country of Tanjore. It appears, that the Nabob had even gone
 the

the length of cutting off all intercourse between the King of Tanjore and the English. It appears that the danger apprehended in the *present system* was, that the present system would not secure to the King of Tanjore "all his *just* rights." How far a danger of this sort, arising from such a sort of cause, to such a sort of system, becomes a proper ground for invading any country, and destroying any prince, must be left to those who have the least remains of equity, or of the common feelings of humanity, in their bosoms.

The second article of the Nabob's reasons for war, is of a kind full as extraordinary as the first; and shews how terribly this poor, innocent, suffering Gentleman was pushed to make out a charge, though no support was required to it, except that of his own testimony. The second article is—The King's having given him no assistance against the Polygars (or, as he calls them, Zemindars) of Marawar and Tondeman; and that after their defeat, he admitted them to a refuge in his dominions, and supplied them with powder and shot *.

The reader cannot avoid recollecting what he has read three or four pages backwards—that one of the grounds of the quarrel with the Rajah, in the war of 1771, is, that the Rajah of Tanjore had made war on those very Nalcooty and Marawar Zemindars,—and now his quarrel with him is, that he had *not* made war upon them. The Nabob first complains of the Rajah's invading them, who were, he says, under

* Considerations, Page 15.

his protection; and now he complains of his not assisting in the invasion of the same persons, as *rebels*.

The full extent of this extraordinary charge will not be evident to the reader, if he is not apprized that the indictment for these two contradictory offences is laid at one and the same time. For it was in the Nabob's invasion of Tanjore, and as a justification of that invasion in 1771, that the Rajah was charged with having made war on these Polygars, as dependents: and it was instantly after the submission of the Rajah of Tanjore, but about two months after this declaration, and the very same year, these unfortunate people were invaded by the Nabob himself as criminals.

No one act of rebellion was alledged against them, *subsequent* to the time when he considered them as under his protection. It does not at all appear, that any assistance was asked from the Rajah of Tanjore against them. It is improbable that any such requisition was made. It would have been at once insolent and unnecessary to have done so: Insolent, as one of the offences alledged by the Nabob against those people, for which they underwent a cruel punishment, was, that they had given no assistance to him against Tanjore;—to call on the King of Tanjore to chastize them for *that* fault, would be too much even for Mahomed Ali. It was unnecessary, because the army led by the Nabob's son to the destruction of the Polygars, had but just defeated the Rajah, and reduced him to submit to the capitulation of 1771. The Nabob never wanted any assistance against these feeble nations.

nations. The English army under his command, was infinitely more than sufficient for what it accomplished, their total destruction; and would have been more than sufficient for the ruin of twenty such.

The Nabob, when he planned that war, represented it to the Company's servants at Madras, as a matter of no sort of difficulty *. In effect it proved so at first: the taking of one of the principal places of the Marawar country, did not cost us twenty men; and the degree of length to which the war was afterwards drawn out, arose from the cruelties exercised in the country, and the Nabob's refusal to the innocent people of those countries, of any sort of terms or security for their ancient privileges, and his depriving them of their hereditary lands, which they cultivated with their manual labour. This drove many to despair, and to those extremities which result from that dreadful situation.

It is far from foreign to the purpose of this discourse, intended to shew the injustice and ill policy of making conquests for Mahometans by the British arms, to enlarge somewhat on the foundation of this war, for not bearing a part in which, the kingdom of Tanjore has been ruined. The train of the Nabob's policy, and the method in which he links war into war, and conquest into conquest, is extremely curious. He first incites the Marawar to hostilities against the King of Tanjore; then he makes war against the King of Tanjore for his hostilities against the Marawar; he

* Company's Appendix, P. 959, 1073.

undertakes a third war against the Marawar, for not assisting him against Tanjore; and a fourth against Tanjore for not assisting him against the Marawar.

The reader recollects, that when the Marawars were, as *good subjects* of the Nabob, to be protected, they were in the estimation of those, who, under that pretext, made war against Tanjore, *not subjects at all*, but independent Princes. If therefore they were not subjects, they could not be rebels on account of any act of hostility; much less could they be called to so severe an account as such, for a neglect of any duty*.

“ We have said more than once” [they are the members of the Presidency themselves, who speak in their consultations]
 “ that we have *no absolute proof*, that the Marawar and Nalcooty are tributaries and dependents on the Nabob’s government. The Nabob *asserts it*, and we have no proof to the contrary †.” But presently the whole difficulty is solved by a fair and candid explanation, which affords a key to the whole of theirs and the Nabob’s politics. “ Because if they were not originally and naturally, He” [the Nabob]
 “ has *made them* his enemies, and *therefore* it is necessary that they should be reduced. *I do not say it is altogether just*; but

* Comp. App. 974. At Consultation, 11 May, 1772, Mr. Mackay, in the discussion on the propriety of the expedition against the Marawar and Nalcooty Polygars, asserts, that “ *it is but lately that the idea of their being tributary to the Nabob has been adopted.*”

† Ibid. 975.

"JUSTICE AND GOOD POLICY ARE NOT OFTEN RELATED*, This explanation clears up every thing. But let us suppose, that the poor Polygars were obliged to assist him to any degree he pleased, against any enemy he had thought fit to provoke; it is certain, that even on that supposition, his complaint was unfounded. It is proved by the testimony of his own favourite Son †, that they actually did assist him, and that a large body of their troops were in our camp before Tanjore, at the time of its surrender: how long before does not appear; for the war was of an extremely short duration. This assistance was probably given without much zeal in that quarrel. The dread of the English, I have no doubt, was the principal, if not sole cause of it: but if they had been the most cordially affected to that business, it was not in their power to have appeared in the field much before the time that we find them there. If the Nabob had thought those unfortunate people deficient, He ought to have remonstrated with them upon their conduct, and have afforded them an opportunity of justification or of atonement. But he had long resolved on their entire extirpation (to use his own favourite term ‡) and therefore carefully concealed from them all his pretended grievances, and all his real intentions §. These unhappy people found an English

* Company's Appendix, P. 969.

† Ibid. P. 907.

‡ Ibid. P. 942 and 943. "When the President desired to be informed what were the Nabob's intentions in this expedition, *He* said, that He meant to "extirpate these Polygars wholly."

§ Company's Appendix, P. 948.

army at their doors, before they knew there was a complaint against them. The Presidency which sent it, knew that the extirpation of those Polygars (so they call the native Princes) was against the Company's orders ;—yet they chose to submit an English army to the ambition of a Barbarian, and to commit the whole conduct of the war and of the peace to his discretion * ; fully apprized, at the same time, of the whole extent of his destructive intentions.

The circumstances which animated them to this cruel expedition against the Marawars, ought to have touched them with compassion for the faults (had there been any such) of this miserable people. Great divisions prevailed amongst them : One part was headed “ only by a poor desolate woman ;” the other was a Prince in a weak and unprotected minority. These circumstances of distress did not hinder them from proceeding to the extirpation of both Prince and People with the most unrelenting rigour. First they stormed Ramanadaporam, the capital of this *poor desolate woman*. It was the seat of a temple, venerated for a peculiar sanctity all over India : it had therefore become a depository of immense riches. But the wealth was chiefly defended by this opinion of the holiness of the place, which was otherwise of little or no strength.

“ The grenadiers and other troops employed, behaved
 “ with remarkable steadiness and coolness during the as-
 “ fault, and those who opposed them, died in the breach

* Company's Appendix, P. 956.

“ with

“ with great bravery. There were in the place 3,000 fight-
 “ ing men, and a number of inhabitants ; many of those who
 “ carried arms were killed, some threw themselves over the
 “ walls, and others fled to the Ranny’s (Queen’s) palace for
 “ protection, and there saved their lives, as the first confusion
 “ was over before the troops advanced so far. — The Ranny,
 “ the young Rajah, and Pitcha Pilla, the Dewan, are priso-
 “ ners : they were found with all their effects, jewels, &c.
 “ and of course the whole of this country must, in a few
 “ days more, fall under the Nabob’s subjection *.” — Some
 movements of pity arose in the breasts of those who were
 obliged to be the actors in these tragical scenes, and the in-
 struments of these wars, in which *policy and justice were so little*
related. — “ The palace (says General Joseph Smith) is one
 “ of the best buildings I have seen in this country, and de-
 “ notes its inhabitants having lived in truly Eastern luxury,
 “ *which I am afraid they will never experience again.* I have
 “ seen the young Marawar, a youth about twelve years of
 “ age ; but the Ranny has been invisible, at least to all Eu-
 “ ropeans ; she has two Daughters, both fit for matrimony.
 “ The young Nabob has taken up his quarters as near them
 “ as he well can, without intruding on their delicacy ;
 “ though I believe, if their minds were known, they wish
 “ him at a farther distance. I have felt very much for the
 “ distresses of these miserable people, though they drew it on

* Company’s Appendix, P. 994.

“ themselves, by not accepting the offers that both the Nabob and myself offered to them *, &c.”

I am almost tired of going through a narrative of the ruin of this princely family ; the distribution of whose immense hereditary riches, was like to create a mutiny before their faces, while the English troops and the Nabob's were ready to draw swords on each other, for a share in their spoils. The same inhuman plundering, and the same quarrels about it, were carried on in every part of that rich country. They who would enter more into the affair, will find it well worthy their attention to read the whole of No. XXVI. in the Company's Papers. I cannot, however, wholly dispense with shewing something of the feelings and opinions of a brave officer, Colonel Bonjour, on that occasion ; (a person who is described by the Presidency, as having a perfect knowledge of the country, and who was certainly, on all accounts, worthy of being employed in a better service ;) because they shew the condition of a country and people about to be subjected to Mahometan government. It was written after the Company's troops had reduced most, if not all the strong places in the Marawar country.—“ † It

* It no where appears what these offers were.—Whatever they might be, the not accepting the terms of an unjust invader may be accused of imprudence, but nothing else. The fact appears by a letter of Colonel Bonjour's (p. 1000.) that she would be ready to submit to any terms, except giving up the Fort, which she calls her house, and is resolved to defend to the last extremity. By the letter too from Calecoil it appears, that the Nabob wished to have the places taken by force, and to make no peace.

† Company's Appendix, P. 1057.

“ is necessary to acquaint you ” [the Presidency] “ with
 “ circumstances that came lately to my certain knowledge ;
 “ by which you will perceive, that all the plan I recom-
 “ mended in my Letter to the Nabob, Waulau Jau, which
 “ Letter *you declined delivering to him*, would not answer the
 “ purpose of absolutely settling this country, *if the basis of*
 “ *the former government is not restored to its original position.*
 “ This former government you must, in some measure, con-
 “ sider the same as those formerly established in Europe, under
 “ the denomination of Feudal Government ; by which men
 “ had land allowed to them by the Lords, which land they
 “ cultivated, or had the inspection of, and the produce be-
 “ came their property, in consequence of being engaged to
 “ take arms at any time the country was exposed, or the
 “ Lords had occasion for their services. *This government seems*
 “ *to have been established from great antiquity in the Marawars ;*
 “ which country being formerly united under a Rajah, did
 “ produce an army of fifty or sixty thousand men for its
 “ defence : but since its division into two provinces, its force
 “ fell in proportion to the disunion of the heads ; who, *when*
 “ *we undertook the conquest*, were not only in discord, but also
 “ the people disaffected by reasons not material to report.
 “ *Expecting a continuation of their ancient privileges, they remained*
 “ *at their ploughs, and in some measure facilitated the means of*
 “ *conquering their Chiefs.* Since the reduction of the different
 “ forts in these countries, the people (except a few vagabonds)
 “ have remained *in a peaceable manner, till the Nabob determined*
 “ *to take from them those lands which they expected to retain ; so*
 P “ that

“ that at present the ploughmen, aggravated by the loss of
 “ their lands, have taken arms all over the country, and even
 “ in their own villages form parties of observation against ours.
 “ In this situation I must represent to you, that the settling
 “ this country in *the manner expected by the Nabob, requires ex-*
 “ *tremities of a shocking nature*; and after all, it is not to be
 “ said that matters will be adjusted so as to answer the sa-
 “ tisfaction of all parties. Those people, being both soldiers
 “ and ploughmen, have the advantage of appearing in what
 “ shape they please before our troops, and never expose them-
 “ selves without being sure of the advantage. When we
 “ are marching we find, all over the country, most villages
 “ abandoned by the men, *there remaining in them only women*
 “ *and children, whom it is likely, if the Nabob persists in this un-*
 “ *dertaking, must, with other poor innocents, become a sacrifice to*
 “ *this conquest.* For, if any of our baggage remains behind,
 “ it is usually taken, our parties and stragglers are attacked:
 “ this is done by the inhabitants of some village or other.
 “ These villages being pointed out to me, I cannot pass the
 “ outrage without punishment; and not finding the objects
 “ upon which my vengeance should fall, I can only deter-
 “ mine it by reprisals, which will oblige me *to plunder and*
 “ *burn those villages; kill every man in them; take prisoners the*
 “ *women and children. These are actions which the nature of*
 “ *this war will require*; for having no enemy to encounter, it
 “ is only by severe examples of that kind, that we may expect
 “ to terminate it, so as to answer *the end proposed.* I wish
 “ his Excellency the Nabob had well balanced the advantages
 “ he

“ He may gain, with the risk we run, in this undertaking,
 “ *before he determined to take from those people the lands in question.*
 “ They are, besides, not so despicable as not to deserve the
 “ privilege of keeping the mentioned land for their occa-
 “ sional services; If regulated so as to oblige every one to be
 “ provided with a pike of a fixed dimension, when called to
 “ the field; and intermixed with a few Seapoys, they would
 “ be very formidable to black cavalry, &c. being such as to
 “ endure great fatigues, and to require but little wants.
 “ The above, Honourable Sir and Sirs, will sufficiently re-
 “ present to you my sentiments in regard of settling this
 “ country, without entering into further details: I have com-
 “ municated the same to the Nabob Umdut Ul Omrah,
 “ Behauder, who seems to agree with my opinion *, but I do
 “ not know what resolution will be taken.—*Wishing to see*
 “ *your arms employed for a wise and more glorious purpose, than*
 “ *the one in agitation,* I have the honour to remain, &c.”

Such was the original justice of the war against this unhappy country; such the mode of carrying it on; such the fruits of the conquest; and such the spirit of the Nabob's Government, wherever we make conquests for him. Here too we see that the Presidency did not dare, or did not chuse to make remonstrances to the Nabob, on the abuse of the advantages obtained by our own arms. After this, it will not, I suppose,

* Umdut Ul Omrah is the Nabob's eldest son, disgraced at his father's court, and neglected by the English; the moderation and humanity of this Prince intitle him to another sort of treatment than what he has found, or is likely to find, while the violent spirits that now prevail in the Durbar councils, continue to influence the Nabob Mahomed Ali.

be thought a great crime in the King of Tanjore (to whose not less miserable case I return) if he did not shew great alacrity in this most unjustifiable war.

After the defeat of the Polygars (it is said) the Rajah admitted them into his own territories, and supplied them with powder and shot. This is the second head of accusation. No proof is given, nor asked of this *fact*; and it is neither true, nor probable, as it stands in the charge. “* He
 “ (the King of Tanjore) not only refused to assist him with
 “ troops against the Marawar and Nalcooty Zemindars, but
 “ he admitted them (when defeated by the Nabob) into his
 “ own territories, and assisted these rebellious subjects with
 “ men, money, powder, and shot.”

It does not appear that the Nabob thought of making this complaint whilst the grievance was fresh, and while the matter, if true, was evident: it required two years to ascertain it. One of these Polygars, then very young, had been cruelly butchered by the Nabob's troops at the taking of one of his places. Him the King of Tanjore could neither receive nor assist. Another boy was made prisoner. The poor desolate woman, who had been robbed in the sanctuary of her temple, never after was in a condition to carry on any war—These hostilities, therefore, stand on the word of the accuser. As to the supposed reception of the Polygars into his territories—If the King of Tanjore did give to these unfortunate gentlemen of his own cast and kindred, some charitable relief in their distress, it does not seem a cause, scarcely a *pretext*, for the

* Considerations, Page 27.

English to subvert the Kingdom of Tanjore. It is the same thing however to the Presidency, whether the charges on him, or on the Polygars, were well or ill grounded. They never enquired into them; they took the whole, on the Nabob's bare narration, and they executed his orders as if they had been a Moorish Divan, and not the Council of the East India Company, and of the English Nation.

The third charge is a parcel of the second; that is, that
 “ * he had taken the *runaway* Polygars of Worriarpollam and
 “ Allianore under his protection, giving them the districts of
 “ Conconum for a residence.”

A fine ground of war! The Nabob calls a man a *Runaway*; and then, if any *neighbour* is humane enough to receive him, that act, becomes an offence of such a magnitude, that the offender is to be destroyed by the English arms.—But when was this offence laid? Had the King notice to refuse the admission of these Runaways into his country, or notice to dismiss them? —Not one word. When did the gentlemen concerned in this affair, examine in what this offence of *running away* consisted, which made an act of humanity to the offenders, so heinous a crime; a crime of such a dye, as to be punished by the pillage, imprisonment, and deposition of a great prince? But, what ends all defence for such acts, is this, that no proof was before the Council of Madras, that the Rajah of Tanjore was at all guilty of this act of humanity. In their eyes it may, I allow, have been a great crime. But how came

* Considerations, P. 27.

they to proceed to the punishment of that crime, without any trial ? The mention of the Polygars of Worriarpollam and Allianore, only serves to call up in our memory the other unjust and inhuman proceedings, by which these Princes were deprived of their patrimony, and made a sacrifice to the tyranny of the Nabob. It may make a part in the enquiry, when an account is called for, of the almost uninterrupted chain of robberies carried on for near twenty years in that harrassed country.

The fourth charge rises upon the others — “ The Rajah “ had, under the plea of borrowing money, mortgaged some “ districts of the Tanjore country to the Dutch, *French*, and “ Danes.” The matter of this charge happens to be in some part a matter of fact ; in others, as usual, it is totally unfounded.

The King of Tanjore was obliged, (on the *plea* of borrowing, as his enemy styles it,) *actually* to borrow of the Dutch, in 1771, in order to enable him to resist the Nabob’s treacherous invasion ; and to mortgage to them, that is, to the Dutch (*and not to the French*) some of his most valuable jewels, and some part of his territories. This *fact*, which the Nabob has the confidence to call only a *plea*, is confessed, and even insisted upon by himself. For, in his late memorial, * he takes credit for having redeemed these very jewels, and those very territories, by the payment of large sums ; and he charges this payment on the revenues of Tanjore, after they

* Company’s Appendix, P. 1541.

had been rescued out of his hands. The matter between the parties, in short, stands thus: The Nabob forces the Rajah of Tanjore, by invasion and violent extortions, to mortgage some of his territories, and then he makes that mortgage a reason for robbing him of all the remainder.

The fifth and last charge: — “* He refused the money agreed for by treaty, 10 lacks still remaining due.”—If this were true, it should naturally have engaged the Presidency to enquire, whether the non-payment amounted (as the charge had stated) to a refusal, or only to a delay: and whether a man, whose powers had sunk under such immeasurable extortions, was not an object, meriting some support, rather than further, and even the utmost depression. The matter of the charge immediately preceding, that is, his mortgage to the Dutch, if it proved delinquency, indicated at the same time a very great appearance of distress; since the unfortunate object of it was obliged, in such a manner, to dismember his territories, and to mortgage them, wherever usury was left free to aid against extortion. These gentlemen were, however, perfectly uniform in their conduct. The truth and the criminality of the fact, as in all their other cases, were to be admitted by them without the least degree or pretence of enquiry whatsoever. With them, the wealth and the poverty of the King of Tanjore were to be equally his crimes. What must be the surprize of the reader (who may be unacquainted with their transactions, and the boldness of their

* Considerations, P. 27.

advocates) to find that this money, which was said by the Nabob, and admitted by the Council of Madrafs, and here repeated by their advocate, to have been *refused*, was, at the time of making the accusation, actually *paid*!

The King of Tanjore knowing (though, indeed, knowing but in part) with what cruel and rapacious enemies he had to deal, moved heaven and earth to raise money for the ultimate payment. Having exhausted the foreign settlements, He applies himself to an active money-dealer, one Comora, an Hindoo of his own religion, adjuring him, by every tie that they held dear in common, not to suffer a Prince and People of his own persuasion, to become a sacrifice to the Mahometans. He desires bills upon Madrafs to the amount of the last payments, and pledges a territorial revenue for the security.

This Comora, was the Dubash or Agent of the famous Mr. Paul Benfield, the Nabob's banker. Whether moved by sentiments of conscience, as he pretended, or thinking the money of his master to be well vested in the territory to be engaged for it, and in an hurry to receive the usury for a payment that was to be made to themselves; or having planned from the beginning, the villany that was afterwards executed, he drew bills on his master, Mr. Paul Benfield, for the money; which bills were put into the Nabob's hands. The deluded King of Tanjore thinking he had at length set himself on secure ground, wrote to the Presidency, that as he had punctually discharged the last payment, he now hoped that

He

He had entitled himself to the Nabob's friendship. But he was mistaken—the Nabob's friendship was too valuable a thing to be so slightly purchased. With these bills in his hands, or in his banker's hands (a fact that has since been confessed by Mr. Benfield himself) he was not ashamed to make the above charge of a refusal of payment; and sent the English troops to invade and conquer that very kingdom, for the exorbitant ransom of which he had just received the last payment.

On these pleas of the Nabob, the Presidency, as if they had a grave and plausible matter before them, finally sit in judgment,—but not with both the parties before them. They declare all ideas of the existence of a guaranty of the King of Tanjore, on the part of the Company, removed; and, without a pretence of their being guarantees of any treaty on the part of the Nabob, they take into consideration “The propriety and necessity of the expedition against Tanjore;” and they assign the three following most curious reasons for engaging in it. 1st. “That in consequence of the *humiliating condition* to which the Rajah has been *obliged to submit at the conclusion of the last peace, and his constant apprehensions of the Nabob's taking possession of his country*, he *must* be willing to join the French, or any power.” 2dly. “Because his total reduction becomes matter of *self-defence*.” 3dly “Because the Nabob will pay his debts in case of disturbances, which he declares he never will do if they will not undertake this expedition *.”

* Company's Appendix, P. 1129.

They who will take the trouble of comparing these raw, uncoloured pretexts, with those of the same kind made on a former occasion, with regard to the King of Tanjore (which I have stated in a note, (page 52,) and with regard to the Marawar Princes (recited in pages 99, 100,) will find a great uniformity in their whole system. First, it is their practice to do the greatest injuries to the native sovereigns; they reduce them to the *most humiliating condition*; they fill them with fear and *apprehensions of taking possession of their country*; and then, kindly to free them from all causes of dread, they realize the evils which they had made them apprehend; they fall upon them; they plunder and subdue them. They conclude from their treatment of them, that the Princes *must* be their enemies, and then, their *total reduction* becomes matter of *self-defence*. To crown the whole; because their Mahometan friend and patron refuses to pay his debts, without a pretence of quarrel, for *the mere purpose of creating a fund for the payment of his debts*, they join him to exterminate their neighbours, benefactors, friends, and allies.

These are the grounds and principles (I shall bestow no epithets upon them) upon which the Nabob proceeded, in the year 1773, with English arms, to the ruin of Tanjore. In this invasion, as much blood was shed as the resistance could admit. Then, with a relentless hand, the Nabob proceeded to pillage the country to the amount, including the perception of the revenues, of more than four millions sterling.

This, the Considerer and his party, call "*justice and policy*,"

I.

" and

“ and the necessity of reassuming vigorous measures against the incorrigible Rajah. It being evident, that in the present system it was dangerous to have such a power in the heart of the province.”*

For the purpose of annihilating *such a power in their present system*, they invented a construction for public engagements, in virtue of which they annulled the treaty of 1762 by that of 1769. By this construction they annulled the treaty of 1769 by the first treaty of 1771, and the first treaty that year they annulled by the second; and then they annulled both the treaties of 1771, by the invasion and usurpation of 1773. The author, who does not like that this curious treaty-breaking invention should be discredited, complains of having the existence of the fundamental treaty of 1762 still supposed. He is absolutely outrageous against the Directors for considering it in that light †. “ We trace,” says he, “ an ignorance and negligence, which though it exculpates them in some measure from intentional mischief, was certainly very criminal in matters of such high concern.” The gentleman’s zeal and warmth against these high crimes and misdemeanors of the Company towards its servants, will not permit him to recollect, that the Direction had never ratified any treaty, but that of 1762; and that their whole correspondence goes upon an idea of the existence of that treaty, as a basis of their right of interference in the disputes between the Nabob and the Rajah. He forgets that the gentlemen concerned in

* Considerations, P. 27.

† Ibid. P. 40.

the war of 1771, suppose its existence (at least at that time) since they declare that they acted *partly* as its guarantees. He forgets also that the Directors, under all the deceptions proved to be practised upon them, never authorized any treaty, or any war, but for the supposed purpose of enforcing that original fundamental treaty.

As to the conquest; the Directors considered it, as what it was, a shocking usurpation. If we have proved that the Nabob was the aggressor and wrong-doer, by the author's rule, he ought to have no benefit of treaties, and such a power ought not to exist: But I do not wish that his own principles should be brought home to the Nabob; I do not wish that any reigning power should be *extirpated*, though every honest man must wish, that they should all of them be kept within the bounds of justice; and that we, the English, as an example of the lesson we teach to others, should keep ourselves within the same limits. This is what every Englishman has a right to demand, from those who are entrusted with the management of any part of the power of this kingdom.

On this state of the grounds and principles of the conquest of Tanjore (not assumed but proved) the public will judge of the propriety of the Company's measures, for restoring it to the natural sovereign and its original government, and of the wildness of the string of schemes, proposed in the pamphlet I am examining, for tearing it again from those natural holds, and once more subjecting this harrassed country to the ferocious rapacity of Mahometan despotism.

If

If Mahomed Ali had originally no right, or colour of right, to have Tanjore conquered for him by English arms, he has no right to have it returned to him by a third violence on the people, and a second deposition of the unhappy King of that country, who neither has furnished, nor in his present state *can* furnish, any kind of pretence for such an outrage. His country is possessed by English troops; to this he has most chearfully consented: He paid, in little more than a year after his restoration, and out of a country ruined by the ravages and extortions of the Nabob, £. 320,000 sterling, for the protection of the Company. He has since granted to the same Company, of his free bounty, Nagore, a territory of value, both for situation and profit. — Yet after all, he is not now at ease from their servants, who have not yet ceased to give countenance to the Nabob's claim of debt; and who even canvass and litigate the value of his late gift, as if it was a debt to themselves. Can that country be subject at once to the English and to the Mahometans? Can the King pay all their multiplied demands? and after having yielded himself and his country to the Company at their own request, on their own terms, and on their own faith, is he to be delivered over to Mahomed Ali, his bigotted as well as his political enemy?

If this idea be not supportable, it is unnecessary for me to take notice of the several ingenious modes and conditions of executing the project for a surrender of Tanjore to the Nabob, which is elaborately argued in the latter end of the pamphlet before us*. I shall only touch upon some of the

* Considerations, p. 68.

extraordinary, scattered topics of the author. This gentleman seems to think, that the King of Tanjore is so near being a prisoner to the English, with their garrison in his fort, that he will not be much worse off, by being totally deposed, and made a prisoner to the Nabob.—Pray, good Sir! let him judge for himself. It is not the Nabob and his partizans, that the King of Tanjore wishes to make his referrees. It is very true, that it is not what is best, but what is not worst of all, that is now in the King of Tanjore's option. If the King of Tanjore must be a prisoner, he does not choose to be prisoner to the Nabob. He is ready to depend on the benevolence of a British King, and a British corporation created and acting by law; though he cannot rely on the mercy of Mahomed Ali, and his Durbar.

But our author tells us, that the Nabob, when he has deposed the King of Tanjore, will give him security for a pension on his revenues. To this excess of Mahomet's generosity, the King of Tanjore will answer, that he chooses to take his own income himself, out of his own territories. Limited as his revenue is, it is still a better security for some kind of rank and authority, than Mahometan faith for a miserable pension.

The Nabob's own, his eldest, Son, starves on his Father's pension; though a Jaghire land is expressly assigned for the payment of it. The Rajah would something doubt of better treatment than this “* good old Prince” (in our author's language) chooses to give his own child. The King of Tanjore

* Considerations, Page 57.

too, remembers well the Nabob's generosity, in the jewels that were torn from the ears of his women; he remembers his own poor and miserable prison; he remembers the credit which the Nabob has since assumed for not having actually taken away his life; he remembers the bare walls to which he was restored, of what had been one of the richest palaces in the world; he remembers, that he owed to private benevolence, that he had a carpet to sit on, or a palankeen to carry him. He is not ignorant of the wretched condition of the Marawar Princes, who (if they are still living) are miserable prisoners in the castle of Trichinopoly*.—On the whole, therefore, the Rajah prefers the worst treatment that the worst humours of the Company's servants can mortify him with, to the tender mercies of a Mahometan master, however the partizans of Mahomed Ali may applaud and magnify the benevolence of his nature.

The author of the Considerations ridicules the idea of the King of Tanjore being in reality restored, whilst English garrisons possess his forts; yet he is not ashamed to propose this very same thing, which he ridicules, should be practised on the delivery of the country to the Nabob, whom he is pleased to consider as the lawful owner. He proposes the very same

* If a virtuous benevolence towards the distressed, or any well-directed ambition, or even a manly avarice, actuated our councils in the East, it would be impossible that these unhappy Gentoo Princes, the native, original Princes of that land, and their country, should be left a prey to the wanton, malicious violence of a Mahometan.

arrangements * as to the garrison of the places by English; but he proposes it with great caution; for he knows that the Nabob having once had English garrisons in all his fortresses, found means to remove them all, and to form a great standing army of his own, trained in the European manner, in the hopes of supporting the new scheme of independence, recommended to him by his English friends and partizans.

I cannot help remarking, that this gentleman, (the author of the *Considerations*) and all those who engage in the cause of Mahomed Ali, in proposing schemes of government, and supporting rights of government in the East, are pleased to confine their attention solely to Princes, and to the rights of Princes. The wretched *people* are no part whatsoever of their consideration. Every man who knows any thing of India, must know the utter detestation those people entertain (I think with very good reason) but whether with good reason or not, they do most certainly entertain, of Mahometan government. To say nothing of the genius of that government in general, and in particular of the government of Mahomed Ali, it will be hardly believed, that all men do not infinitely prefer a subjection to Princes of their own blood, manners, and religion, to any other; that they will not be more obedient to such Princes; and that such Princes will not be reciprocally

* *Considerations*, P. 69. "Be it agreed, for the general safety, that the Company shall garrison the principal forts in Tanjore, and keep up such a force as the Nabob may deem competent to the defence of that kingdom."

more tender of them. This natural and reciprocal partiality, is matter of great consideration in all governments; but it is peculiarly so among those nations where there is no settled law or constitution, either to fix allegiance, or to restrain power.

If the Company, who under the name of alliance, or under even the name of subjection to a Mogul, are in reality now the actual Sovereigns and Lords paramount of India, still choose, as hitherto they have done, and as in wisdom perhaps they ought to do, to have a dependent government interposed between them and the native people, it is both their interest and duty that it should be such as is congenial to the native inhabitants, correspondent to their manners, and soothing to their prejudices. The native Indians, under their own native government, are, to speak without prejudice, a far better people than the Mahometans; or than those who by living under Mahometans, became the depressed subjects, or the corrupted instruments of their tyranny; they are of far milder manners, more industrious, more tractable, and less enterprising.

The Arabians, and Tartars, and Persians, and their Clans of Mussulmen, are full as rapacious, and infinitely more fierce and cruel, than the English who are sent to make their fortunes in India in a civil or military capacity. The English have neither the same disposition, nor the same degree of boldness, nor in many cases, even the same means of oppression. Without however disputing which is the more intolerable

weight, it is certain, that no people can bear two such riders. It was our business to respect *possession* as the only title that can be valid, where a great empire is broken up; and the rather, as it is the title on which we ourselves stand. It was our business, that no antiquated claims should be revived; and no disturbances raised on such dangerous pretences. It was our duty, in order to make some sort of compensation for the mischiefs inseparable from a foreign and commercial superiority, to keep a balance of justice and proportion in the several powers that were subordinate to us; one of the last things in the world which we were justified in doing, was to encourage arbitrary and boundless pecuniary demands, under the barbarous names of Nazirs, Crores, &c. &c.; and least of all ought we to support such demands in favour of any person whose own strength was not sufficient to enforce his own injustice. When we did this, then it became not the robbery of another, but our own. Extortion, always the endemial distemper of that part of the world, began to be aggravated in all its symptoms, when Asiatic avarice was supported by European arts and discipline. Whereas our evident duty, and our clearest interest, was to employ those arts and that discipline, and the power that grew out of them, to meliorate the condition of the subject and the dependent, rather than to enforce the wild claims of a pretender, or to enforce the intolerable despotism even of the lawful possessors of power. All this we might have done, and in a great measure may still do, without any sort of diminution (to

speak within compass) of revenue ; and with an infinite increase of our reputation. But fatally, we have suffered, for a long time, a contrary course to prevail, to the ruin of the fine country that has fallen into our hands ; and England has thought proper to look on unconcerned, whilst the English arms have been employed by a ferocious and insatiable Mahometan, to exterminate near twenty native hereditary princes, of very ancient, and in that part of the world, illustrious families. But though this depredation and ruin, and in many instances this total extinction, of noble houses, be itself a matter which commonly excites no small degree of commiseration in all liberal minds ; yet it is a consideration infinitely inferior to that of such multitudes of the native people, once under the dominion of these deposed Princes, but who are now subjected to the intolerable burden of the Mahometan yoke. The poverty and depopulation of the country which has ensued, is a thing to be deplored ; and surely the cause of such serious evils ought to be speedily investigated.

If there was a real disposition to investigate, and to redress these grievances, it would not be a matter of difficulty to lay before the public, in clear and distinct particulars, the horrors of the Mahometan government in India, as it is exercised in its most destructive manner by the Nabob of Arcot, as well in those territories of which the English arms had originally put him in possession, as in those of which they have made him master, by a series of near twenty years violence, war, and desolation : but as that great and necessary work is not

yet undertaken, it will be sufficient, for the present, to lay before the reader some hints of what appeared to the Company, at several periods, to be the spirit of Mahometan domination; its tendency to destroy the eminent nobility, who were compelled by us to a dependence upon it; and some small part of its oppressive consequences on the low and industrious part of the Indian community. It must be allowed, to the Company's honour, that they have in general endeavoured to check these excesses, though with little effect, as we have seen. However, their views seem to be perfectly conformable to the opinions of the best judges of the state of affairs in India *, and to the plan of government here laid down. "We apprehend," say the Directors, in their letter to the President and Council at Fort Saint George, dated 4th March 1767, "that if any
 " thing can give us the interior, peaceable, and quiet possession of the Circars †, it will be such a kind of government
 " as shall make the several Rajahs and Zemindars feel and
 " acknowledge its justice, mildness, and equity, above all
 " others that they have been accustomed to; so long as

* "You will see," says Colonel Bonjour, "by my Letter to his Highness the Nabob, *that force of arms alone will not effect the settling and tranquillity of this country.* This, I must enforce, by requesting you will support my opinion before him; for *I cannot promise you any thing favourable from the operations I may direct, when they are not supported by a system of government suitable to the genius, customs, and privileges of the people who are to be influenced by it.*" Letter from Colonel Bonjour to the Presidency of Madras. Company's Appendix, P. 1046. This letter the Presidency did not choose to deliver to the Nabob.

† The territories in the Kingdom of Golconda, acquired by the Company within these few years.

" they

“ they live in obedience and fulfil the engagements they
 “ are bound to : effects which we much doubt whether
 “ they would ever have derived *from* the Company’s go-
 “ vernment, had the *Nabob, or any other native of Indostan,*
 “ *been entrusted with the particular management.* What we
 “ have said, implies a confidence in *you*, that the Rajahs,
 “ Zemindars, and every other inhabitant, will be protected
 “ in the possession of their *just and hereditary rights* : we
 “ mean not only as relative to oppression from the mem-
 “ bers or ministers of *our own government*, but also from the
 “ encroachments and attempts of each other *.” — They
 think a *balance of power* ought to be kept between them ;
 that therefore “ they wish the present Indian powers to
 “ *remain* as a check upon one another †.” — “ That they
 “ mean to distribute to every man his own ; and by a
 “ just, mild, and prudent conduct towards them, to evince,
 “ that conquests and plunder are not the objects of our
 “ pursuits ‡.” — They forbid “ the extirpation of the Poly-
 “ gars §, though they wish them in obedience to the Na-
 “ bob.” — “ They observe with concern, that in certain coun-
 “ tries ||, their troops have been put to *disagreeable services*,
 “ more especially as the rebellion of the Polygars may, they
 “ fear, with *too much justice*, be assigned to the *mal-administration*
 “ *of the Nabob’s collectors.*” — “ That it was repugnant to hu-
 “ manity, to force them to such *dreadful extremities as they*

* Company’s Appendix, Page 511.

† Ibid. P. 519.

‡ Ibid. P. 523.

§ Madura and Tinnevely.

|| Those reduced by us to a subjection
to Mahomed Ali.

“ *underwent.* ” — “ That *some* examples of severity *might* be necessary, but it should be on the *leaders*, when they fall into the Nabob’s hands, and *not by the destruction of the country.* ” — “ That the false policy of this should be represented to the Nabob, &c. ” — “ * That they fear his government is by no means of the mildest ; and that there is great oppression in collecting his revenues †. ”

The Company, who knew, and therefore wished to discountenance, his oppressions of the native princes and nobility, and of the people at large, in the collection of the revenues, were also perfectly apprized of his peculiar oppressions on the sources of all revenue, the manufacturers of the country. These manufacturers they knew were obliged to fly into the strong holds of the Indian Princes, for a protection against Mahometan tyranny ; which is a practical proof, worth an hundred arguments, to decide the difference between the two governments. The Company therefore direct, “ That in reducing the Polygars, they were to be cautious not to deprive the *weavers* and manufacturers of the protection they often meet with in the strong holds of the Polygar countries ‡. ” — And in their Letter to the Nabob himself, they think fit (knowing his practice) to give him the like caution : “ We entreat your Excellency in particular, to make the *manufacturers* the objects of your tenderest care ; particularly, that *when you root out*

* Company’s Appendix, P. 523.

† Ibid. 524.

‡ Ibid. 524.

“ *the Polygars, you do not deprive the weavers of the protection they enjoyed under them* *.”

It is unnecessary to observe to the reader, that when the Company permitted the Nabob to destroy the protection which the manufacturers enjoyed against his tyranny, their humane advice to him, with relation to those miserable wretches, when he had got them once more into his power, was likely to be but of small benefit or consolation to them. I have therefore quoted this passage, not to shew the efficacy of the Company's interference with their *counsels*, against the effects of their *arms*, but to shew their strong sense of the probable condition of those whom they were going to surrender to the Nabob's mercy: It is not wholly unlike the kindness of the Lisbon Inquisition, when they deliver a miserable Jew to the secular arm. Even the Presidency of Madrafs, which at the very time it was preparing to make the war of 1771 against the King of Tanjore, in order to extend the sphere of the Nabob's tyranny, speaking of the distresses which a country, already subjugated to him, had suffered from a most grievous and wasteful war (brought on solely by his restless ambition) express themselves of his government in the following manner: “ That they” [the distresses by the war] “ have been certainly *great*; but those
“ by the *Nabob's oppressions* we believe to be *greater than all*,
“ because *they are without intermission*; the other are *temporary*;

* Company's Appendix, P. 527.

“ by

“ by all which oppressions, we believe, the Nabob has great
 “ wealth in store.”

It would be perfectly useless to remark on these dispositions and proceedings of the Nabob, if the cause of the evil and the means of redress were not both in ourselves. All this ambition, pride, and tyranny of Mahomed Ali, and all the usurpations and oppressions by which this enormous wealth has been hoarded by him, are wholly supported by an unnatural and extrinsic force. The English commanders, who had the misfortune to have some of the Nabob's troops as an incumbrance on their operations in his favour, declare, “ that they could have no dependence on them,” and that “ they were the worst they had ever seen *.” The Company has frequently expressed the same sentiments, and given their directions accordingly. — “ That the Nabob is universally
 “ known to be a man of no resources in himself.” — “ A
 “ Nabob who cannot support himself.” — “ That his army
 “ is an useless rabble.” — “ That the leaving the fortresses
 “ of the Carnatic to his defence, would be to expose the
 “ very being of the Company on the coast of Coromandel,
 “ to the greatest risk †.” On that account, they heavily and justly accuse their servants for engaging to effectuate so desperate a design. “ On tracing the subject minutely, we

* Company's Appendix, P. 1165. General Smith's letter, 1st Aug. 1773.

“ Not one of the Nabob's irregulars, horse, or seapoys, which you mention,
 “ have joined me, *and what I have seen of the latter are the worst-regimented troops*
 “ *I ever saw in any service.*”

† Company's Appendix, P. 538.

“ find, that no sooner was the Nabob put in possession of the
 “ said forts, and the Company’s troops removed, than his
 “ own rebellious subjects were hardy enough to attempt
 “ * *re-taking* some of them ; and their success shews, that
 “ they had little more to do than to appear before them, in order
 “ to obtain possession. On which account the Nabob himself
 “ declared, *he was tired out with the frequent accounts received*
 “ *of the depredations of the plunderers*, and that he was fully
 “ convinced *his troops* were utterly unequal to the task of
 “ suppressing them †.”

This Potentate, so described by the Company, and so described by himself,—a Potentate, who is so far from being in a condition to defend himself against a foreign enemy ‡, that he is not able to support the police in his own territories without an English army—has had these important fortresses, contrary to repeated orders from Europe, delivered up to his garrisons ; has had conquests of vast territories made for him by our blood and treasure, against the same repeated orders, and millions of unhappy people, without check or control of any kind, delivered over to his arbitrary discretion. This Potentate on sufferance, this creature of natural and indefeasible

* N. B. The word *re-taking* is remarkable ; for, in fact, he has but few places which have not, at some time or other, been violently taken by the Company’s Servants from the lawful Proprietors, and delivered to him.

† Company’s Appendix, P. 541.

‡ The Marattas claim, and at times exact a chout or tribute from him. Chout is the Maratta word for Tribute, or more properly for Contribution, as *Peshcush* is the Nabob’s term for the same thing.

dependence, whose very power exists in his subjection, is set up, not only as an independent Sovereign, but as a great Conqueror. The very persons, without whom he has no existence, have thought proper, in spite of his unalterable imbecillity, to declare themselves his vassals, and to act so much in that character, "that," as they themselves tell us, "the *English* are considered in India as indeed *great and powerful*, but that they are *entirely subordinate to the Nabob*, and *obliged to employ that force according to his pleasure*." He who is himself abroad a bugbear, and at home a shadow, is however, by the just terrors of our substantial power, become dreadful to almost all his neighbours; and within his own territories exercises an oppression, which outrages humanity, over the Princes and people, not yet extirpated, whom we have bowed to his yoke. That yoke the weakness and despotism of his government would have both provoked and enabled them effectually to shake off, if the dread of the immediate march of the army of a Christian and free people to succour Mahometan despotism, did not even forbid them so much as to complain under their sufferings.

Formerly the Vakeels or Agents of the Indian Princes, were admitted to Madras; their complaints were heard, and their claims were considered. If justice was not always done, it was never formally denied; and the English Company appeared as a power of dignity in India. But at present, they are taught to direct their eyes to the Nabob as principal.—Of late, almost every agent from every state in India, has
been

been excluded from the least correspondence with our Presidency * ; whilst the Durbar of the Nabob was surrounded with such a crowd of foreign ministers, as gave it the air of an imperial court. They submitted (or, as they say, were compelled to submit) to this humiliation, and consented to exist for no other purpose than as Agas of the Janizaries, to the Durbar of Mahomed Ali. Whenever he wants to make a conquest, or to suppress any rebellion, they are applied to for their assistance : But when they begin to enquire either into his politics, or his government, they are charged not to interfere : It is no business of theirs :—Such is the use of our conquests in India. By what machinery this strange system, apparently so contrary to reason, nature, common sense, and common humanity, is set at work and supported, may be laid open to the public at some other time. The author of this little discussion has prepared a full, and as he thinks satisfactory explanation of it. Prudential reasons induce him to keep it back for the present ; but it is not improbable that the activity of some persons will compel him to produce it.

If we had conquered for ourselves, if we had reserved in the provinces, which have been subdued by our arms, any means of protection to the inhabitants ; if we had put any sort of check on the new despotism which we had set up, something might be said in favour of that series of wars,

* What has been done to remedy this great abuse within the last year, I am not acquainted with ; but thus things stood when the King of Tanjore was invaded.

which have brought such destruction on our species. European oppression has, in its worst form, some traits of mildness in it; but we sold both our virtues and vices to the Mahometans, and made the miserable Indians pay the purchase.

It is not however enough, it seems, that many great and originally independent Indian Provinces, formerly kingdoms, have been subjected to the Mahometans. Tanjore alone (among many to whom the same justice is due) is rescued, half ruined as it is; and this escape of an unhappy Prince and country, is represented to a British Parliament, and a Christian people, as the greatest of all subjects of sorrow and lamentation.

One would really imagine, from the piteous complaints of the book before us, that the Nabob had been deprived of all his original territories; had been despoiled of all his private possessions; his women cruelly stripped of all the ornaments of their persons; his house robbed to the bare walls; and his person mercilessly imprisoned. — These indeed are the miseries—not, which the Nabob has himself *suffered*, but those which he has *inflicted* on the King of Tanjore, and upon many other unredressed and helpless men, of great rank and distinction.—But when you hear him, or his advocates for him, talking to you of the “ * good old Prince, “ humbled into the dust before the servants of the Company;”—entreating Lord Pigot “ to shew mercy to his “ old age and white hairs;”—that “ his dignity yielded to

* Considerations, P. 55 and 57.

“ his friendship ;”—that “ *a participation with his friends* was
 “ his greatest pleasure ;”—“ to leave him in possession in *name*
 “ *only*, to preserve his honour and character, and not to dis-
 “ grace him in the eyes of Asia”—it is surely impossible for
 the hardest heart not to be touched—If after this pathetic
 peroration, you come to examine into the nature of the
 grievance which gives rise to so rueful a complaint, it
 will, I believe, excite some other passion rather than pi-
 ty, when you find that the distress of the “ good old Prince”
 is no more or less than this—That he has been helped by
 the English arms, to destroy not above twenty considerable
 Princes, a thousand times better men and better born than
 himself; that he has been only enabled to waste, rob, and
 oppress a vast tract of country, once the most populous and
 flourishing upon earth; that he has been able to engage us to
 make for him, no more than two cruel and unprovoked wars
 on the King of Tanjore; and in two years to rob him of no
 more than five millions of his money and effects. This is the
 subject of the complaint of “ the good old prince;” this is what
 has humbled him to the dust; and it is for these indignities
 and injuries, that we are called upon to “ have mercy on
 “ his white hairs.” It would provoke one’s laughter, if it
 did not excite so much of our indignation, to see such an
 audacious attempt made to pervert our benevolent natural
 feelings, and to debauch our sympathy from the sufferings of
 the oppressed, to bestow them on the disappointments of the
 oppressor; to divert our compassion from those who complain,
 because

because they endure great wrongs, to those who raise an outcry, because they are not permitted to continue and increase them. It is hoped, however, that the active partizans of oppression will do good at last ; and, by officiously bringing those matters into discussion, will rouse the humanity and justice of his Majesty, this Nation, and the Company, in favour of the unhappy Nations, Princes, and People, who are under our protection, and from whom we derive infinite benefits.

A P P E N D I X.

Present establishment of the kingdom of Tanjore, as settled by the Treaties of 1762 and 1769, by the order of the Court of Directors in 1775, and by the Conditions agreed on between the King of Tanjore and the East India Company in 1776; and which will scarcely be thought not sufficiently advantageous for the East India Company.

ARTICLES of Agreement between the King of Tanjore and the Nabob of Arcot *.

I. **T**HE King of Tanjore shall pay an annual Peshouch or Tribute to the Mogul, of *two lacks of rupees*, and no more.

II. The King of Tanjore shall pay the further yearly sum of two lacks of rupees, and no more, in full for the usual and customary presents or Durbar charges †.

* Vid. Treaty and Agreement made and concluded between the Nabob of Arcot and the King of Tanjore in 1762. This treaty is guarantied by the President and Council at Madrafs, and approved by the Court of Directors.—Company's Appendix, P. 77 & seq.

† This, and this only, is what the Nabob has any pretence to for his own profit; the treaty specifically distinguishes it from the Mogul's tribute.

III. The

III. The Nabob shall confirm to the King of Tanjore the full and free possession of the districts of Covilady and Elangad.

* In 1764 and 1765, disputes arising concerning the banks of the river Cavery, the Presidency of Madras are directed, as guarantees of the treaty of 1762, to support the King of Tanjore in his right to the repair of the said banks; and the country of Tanjore must suffer famine, if the banks are not preserved.

By the treaty with Hyder Ali in 1769, the peaceable possession of his kingdom is secured and guaranteed to the Rajah of Tanjore.

* Vid. Comp. App. P. 86.

ARTICLES of Agreement between the King of Tanjore and the East India Company in 1776 †.

I. The King of Tanjore shall admit a garrison of the troops of the Company into the fort of Tanjore, and assign revenues sufficient for the maintenance of the said troops,

† Orders of the Court of Directors for the restoration of the King of Tanjore, and Lord Pigot's letter to the Court of Directors, 2d Sept. 1776.

and for providing military stores necessary for the defence of the garrison *.

II. All repairs of fortifications shall be conducted by the Company's engineer at the King of Tanjore's expence; but no works or repairs shall be undertaken without his approbation and consent, which should always be signified in writing; nor until an estimate shall have been made of the charge to be incurred, and the measure fully approved and authorised by the Governor and Council.

III. No treaty with foreign powers shall be concluded by the King of Tanjore, without the Company's concurrence; nor shall any alliance be formed by him to their prejudice; nor any aid or assistance be given, directly or indirectly, to the enemies of the British nation.

IV. In case troubles shall arise in the kingdom of Tanjore, and the troops of the Company, or of the Nabob, shall march to the King of Tanjore's assistance at his requisition, all extraordinary expences incurred thereby shall be defrayed by him, over and above the charges of the garrison aforesaid.

* The following are the installments by which the King of Tanjore has stipulated to pay 400,000 pagodas annually, for the maintenance of troops.

In November	=====	=====	20,000
December	=====	=====	40,000
January	=====	=====	40,000
February	=====	=====	100,000
March	=====	=====	100,000
April (a)	=====	=====	100,000
			400,000

(a) These fix are the productive months.

V. No troops whatever, except those of the Company, shall be permitted to reside within the city of Tanjore, and except all such native * guards as may be necessary for supporting the dignity of his Majesty's government ; and the number of such native guards shall be fixed by the Governor and Council, and not be exceeded or augmented by the King of Tanjore, on any account or pretence whatever.

VI. In regard to furnishing supplies in time of war, the King of Tanjore *shall not be obliged to comply with any requisition for troops, unless our Governor and Council join the Nabob in making such requisition* ; nor shall the quota to be furnished to the Circar be left indefinite, but be limited to such supplies as shall on all occasions be deemed just and reasonable by the said Governor and Council ; and the charge thereof, if defrayed by the King of Tanjore, shall be deducted from the annual tribute to be paid by him to the Nabob of the Carnatic.

VII. On the part of the Company it is stipulated, that no diminution of his authority over his subjects is intended by them ; and that they will severely punish every military officer, or Company's servant, who shall in any respect interfere in the affairs of his government.

VIII. That particular accounts of the expence of the garrison shall be laid before him every three months, or so

* Tanjore Papers, vol i. p. 104. Rajah of Tanjore's letter to the governor.
 " For my body guard, I shall keep a body of men from one hundred to five hundred ; and I want not to have one man, either horse or foot, more than that number."

often as he shall require it ; that no extravagance shall be permitted, nor any improper charge be allowed in such accounts ; and that if the annual amount thereof shall at any time be less than the revenues assigned to the Company, the surplus of the said revenues shall be faithfully returned to him * ; but if the expence of the garrison shall exceed the amount of the revenues so assigned, then the King of Tanjore shall make good the deficiency.

IX. That if any disputes arise respecting contingent or other expences, they shall be finally adjusted by the King of Tanjore's agents, and our President and Council, and not otherwise.

X. That the troops to be maintained by the King of Tanjore, shall be employed in his defence *alone*, so long as he keeps his faith with the Company.

XI. That no greater proportion of the revenues to be assigned to the Company, be required, than shall be deemed absolutely necessary for the support of the garrison ; but if any unforeseen circumstance shall render such revenue inadequate thereto, the King of Tanjore must, as before observed, cause payment of the troops to be made from his other resources.

* It is not the business at present, to enquire how far this and other parts of these stipulations have been observed by the Company's servants. It must not be doubted, that the Directors will, in their own time, effectually provide, that a country thus surrendered to their power will feel the benefit of their justice, and not be harrassed by needless, unfounded, vexatious, and unjust demands.

often as he shall require it; that no exchange shall be
permitted, nor any transport charge be allowed in such
accounts; and that if the annual amount of the
sum be less than the revenue allotted to the Company, the
surplus of the said revenue shall be faithfully returned to
him; but if the expense of the garrison shall exceed the
amount of the revenue allotted to the King of Tan-

gore shall make good the deficiency.
XXI. That if any dispute arise respecting contingent or
other expenses, they shall be finally referred by the King of
Tanjore's agents and our Residents and Council, and not
otherwise.

XXII. That the troops to be maintained by the King of
Tanjore shall be supplied in all necessaries, to long as he

shall be at peace with the Company.
XXIII. That the garrison of the fortress to be
maintained by the Company, be reduced, they shall be deemed
absolutely necessary for the support of the garrison, but in
any other case the Company shall not be bound to maintain
any troops, and the King of Tanjore shall be bound to
maintain them, and to pay the expenses of the troops to be
maintained by him.

XXIV. That the King of Tanjore shall be bound to
maintain a garrison of 1000 men, and to pay the
expenses of the garrison, and to maintain the
fortress, and to pay the expenses of the fortress.

66. 66. 66

